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I. INTRODUCTION
Legal definitions of life and death currently highlight
important inconsistencies in legal thought. Ironically, there is
significant disagreement about the appropriate legal definition of
life, but relatively little conflict, at least currently, about the
legal definition of death. This may mean that Americans care
more about life in its infancy and less about life at its end when
the future seems bleak.' But whatever the reason for this
apparent disjunction, it is reflected in the law. Further, current
legal definitions of life and death are not exclusive: a person may
be legally alive for one purpose and yet legally dead (or
nonexistent) for another. While these inconsistencies may not
trouble every reader, they do beg the question of what the legal
distinction between life and death should be.
This Article suggests a new approach for thinking about the
legal definition of life. First, this Article argues that legal
definitions of life and death should be defined as moments in
time. While biologists and theologians often define life and death
as ongoing processes and not as moments in time, the law must
be more precise in its definition of life and death because
important legal consequences flow from both definitions. Second,
this Article explores the historical and current legal definitions
of life and death. Currently, the legal definition of death is less
controversial and fairly consistent, whereas the legal definitions
of life are extremely controversial and varied. Third, the Article
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law.
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1 While the Terry Schiavo case may suggest that people care greatly about certain
end-of-life situations, that case had little to do with the legal definition of death. Terry
Schiavo was legally alive and the debate centered on her right to die in accordance with
her true wishes. The Schiavos and Terry's husband simply disagreed about what Terry's
wishes were.
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uses a symmetrical understanding of life and death, what I call
the forced symmetry approach,2 to lend a new perspective to the
abortion debate. Logic appears to dictate that if someone is
declared dead because that person has lost some sort of
functioning, such as brain functioning, then perhaps the
emergence of this functioning in a person should define the
beginning of life. In other words, if the loss of X makes a person
legally dead, then the emergence of X should make a person
legally alive. Because legal definitions of life and death are more
usefully defined as moments in time, life and death under this
approach are mutually exclusive.
Ultimately, the forced symmetry approach suggests some
interesting, yet not conclusive, answers about when legal life
should begin.3 First, it suggests that conception, quickening, and
viability may not be particularly good legal definitions of life.
Second, it suggests that a brain birth I or brain birth II
definition of life might be the best legal definition of life in a
world where the law is an imperfect, but necessary, tool for
setting minimally acceptable moral standards.4
II. THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF LIFE AS A MOMENT IN TIME
Life and death should be defined legally as moments in time
because process-based definitions would create unnecessary
confusion and because the legal consequences of life or death are
immense. But before it is possible to choose which moment in
time should define legal life, it is necessary to understand the
conflict between legal definitions of life and medical definitions of
life and explore why a process-based medical definition of life is
not ideal in the legal setting.
Many disciplines, particularly the sciences, see life and
death as interrelated processes. "Death commences with the very
2 The forced symmetry approach is an approach that I created for systematically
applying a symmetrical understanding of life and death to legal definitions. It is
similar to, and inspired by, the approach Dr. John M. Goldenring takes when
considering medical definitions of life and death in John M. Goldenring,
Correspondence, Development of the Fetal Brain, 307 New Eng J Med 564 (1982) and
John M. Goldering, The Brain-Life Theory: Towards a Consistent Biological
Definition of Humanness, 11 J Med Ethics 198 (Dec 1985).
3 The Article's conclusions are tentative because the primary purpose of the Article
is to introduce the forced symmetry approach to the legal community. Much more could,
and should, be written on this topic.
4 Of course this is not the only purpose of the law. By this statement, I only mean to
suggest that where there is a great moral divide in a pluralistic society, the law is
charged with setting standards that, in part, prescribe the minimal moral conduct that is
acceptable to a majority of the population.
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beginnings of life as the body constantly sloughs off and replaces
dead cellular material."5 As people age, various organs begin to
weaken and eventually, if a person is not killed by accident or
disease, certain organs will cease to function.' While
transplantation or mechanical substitutes can replace some
organs, nothing can stop the mechanisms of death itself. On the
other hand, even cardiopulmonary death and brain death cannot
prevent the continuation of biological life. Some cells,
particularly those with a slower metabolic rates, may continue to
live for minutes, hours or even days after someone has been
declared dead.7 From a biological perspective, therefore, the
boundaries of life and death are not clear.
The quandary, therefore, is how life and death should be
defined in the law, where certainty is often prized.' The essential
problem is that defining life, or for that matter death, as a single
point in time means picking a point along a continuum of
seemingly reasonable choices. If a person chooses a point at the
beginning of the continuum, such as conception, as the definition
of life, then that person must counter arguments that sperm and
ova should be protected as life either because they are
5 Ronald M. Green, Toward a Copernican Revolution in Our Thinking About Life's
Beginning and Life's End, 66 Soundings 152, 162 (1983). See also Hans C. Lou,
Developmental Neurology 5 (Raven 1982) (noting that "[c]ell death is in fact an important
regulatory mechanism during early [fetal] development: [i]t is estimated that for every
neuron which survives, six may die").
6 See John Pathy, Principles and Practice of Geriatric Medicine 2 (Wiley 3d ed 1998)
(summarizing physiological decline and functional deterioration with age).
7 Kenneth V. Iserson, Death to Dust 17 (2d ed. 2001) ("Even though a person
may be dead because his heart stops working, some muscle, skin, and bone cells may
live on for many days ... The amount of time these cells and tissues live depends on
their ability to survive without oxygen and other nutrients and with the increasing
amount of metabolic waste products building up within them."). See also Kathryn L.
McCance & Sue E. Huether, Pathophysiology 49-51 (3d ed 1998). Normally cells use
oxygen to produce ATP (adenosine triphosphate), the breakdown of which powers
several important cell functions necessary for cellular life. Id at 50. When a person
experiences cardiopulmonary death, the body stops circulating oxygen to its cells. Id.
Eventually each cell uses up its remaining oxygen and switches to anaerobic
metabolism, a process by which the cell creates ATP from glycogen. Id at 51. Only
when the cell's glycogen storage is depleted does the process of necrosis, cellular
dissolution, begin. Id at 69. Necrosis includes multiple cellular changes, including
autolysis (cellular self-digestion). Id. Postmortem autolysis does not manifest itself
until twenty-four to forty-eight hours after cardiopulmonary death. Id at 78. Even
then, biological functions of the human body have not ceased because autolysis
requires "enzymes [to] continue to work after death, destroying tissues." Iserson,
Death to Dust at 384 (cited in note 7).
8 Rules, however, are not always preferred to standards. For insight into the
rules versus standards debate see, for example, Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner,
An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J Legal Stud 257 (1974) and Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L J 557 (1992).
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biologically alive or because of their potential to become
genetically complete homo sapiens. If a person chooses a point
later on the continuum, such as birth, as the definition of life,
then that person must counter arguments that life does not
begin until an infant is conscious of his or her surroundings. In
other words, any point along the continuum, no matter where it
falls, is always subject to some moral or logical attack. There
simply is no "right" answer, and science, often considered a
neutral arbitrator in these matters, is incapable of providing one.
Since science cannot provide a satisfactory and conclusive
answer as to which moment in time defines life, one might think
that any acceptable legal definition of life should be process-
based. But a process-based definition of life, which recognizes
that people may sometimes be more alive and sometimes less
alive, is inadequate in a legal system where uncertainty is costly.
Physicians, who do their best to predict a disease's course or the
length of time someone has until his or her heart stops beating,
are often inaccurate.9 It is nearly impossible to determine where
a person is along the continuum of life. A bilinear classification
of life and death, therefore, is preferable.
Life and death also need to be clearly defined as instants in
time because the transition into or out of these states
significantly changes a person's legal status. For example, at
death, life insurance policies become due, questions about the
distribution of the decedent's property arise, and estate taxes are
calculated based on the valuation of the decedent's assets as of
the date of death. Death also ends certain parental and marital
obligations, signals the moment when organs can be donated,
and gives family members quasi-property rights in the
decedent's body. Similarly, the emergence of life creates legally
binding parental responsibilities, allows for the creation of bank
accounts in the infant's name, and in some states, may make the
difference between a successful and unsuccessful charge of
murder. Defining life to occur days, hours, or even minutes
sooner or later can not only have a great impact on the
individual being born, but it can also have significant legal
consequences for others. Perhaps this is why the legislature and
9 In fact, one review found that "[d]octors' predictions for terminally ill cancer
patients (a population very close to death with a median survival of approximately four
weeks) were inaccurate-they were correct to within a week in only 25% of cases and off
by more than four weeks in a similar number." Paul Glare, et al, A Systematic Review of
Physicians' Survival Predictions in Terminally I1 Cancer Patients, 327 BMJ 195, 198
(2003).
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courts have consistently sought a moment-in-time definition of
life and death even though scientific evidence that shows life and
death are biological processes.'0
III. CURRENT AND HISTORICAL DEFINITIONS OF LIFE AND DEATH
While life and death are mutually exclusive moments in
time, their legal definitions have developed independently. As a
result, legal definitions of life have no apparent relation to legal
definitions of death. This section explores historical and current
legal definitions of life and death, including the development of
the Uniform Determination of Death Act ("UDDA").11 It
concludes that the legal definition of death is relatively uniform
and uncontroversial. In contrast, however, the legal definition of
life seems to be in constant flux. The definition of life not only
varies depending upon the particular legal situation, but it is
continually retooled within each particular situation.
A. The Legal Definition of Death
While the current brain death standard was controversial
when it came into existence in the late 1960s, it is widely
accepted today.'2 The brain death standard emerged in response
to new medical technologies, primarily the development of the
ventilator and organ transplant technology. 3 Soon after its
development, the brain death standard was widely recognized
with the adoption of the UDDA in all states. Although some
states allow slight variations from the UDDA for religious
reasons, 4 it is fairly universal and uncontroversial today. 5
10 "While it may be said that persons who are alive at the same time are living
simultaneously, death occurs precisely when life ceases and does not occur until the heart
stops beating and respiration ends. Death is not a continuing event and is an event that
takes place at a precise time." Thomas v Anderson, 215 P2d 478, 482 (Cal D Ct App
1950).
11 Uniform Determination of Death Act §1 (1980), 12A ULA 593 (1996) (defining
death as "irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions" or "irreversible
cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem").
12 See Swafford v State, 421 NE2d 596, 598 (Ind 1981) ("In tandem with the
development of the mechanical capacity to sustain heartbeat and respiration, the concept
of 'brain death' has gained virtually universal acceptance in the medical profession.").
13 Bryan J. Jennett, Medical Definitions ofDeath, 3 Encyclopedia of Forensic and
Legal Medicine 230, 231 (2005).
14 NJSA 26:6A(5) (1996) ("The death of an individual shall not be declared., when the
licensed physician authorized to declare death, has reason to believe, on the basis of
information in the individual's available medical records, or information provided by a
member of the individual's family... that such a declaration would violate the personal
beliefs of the individual."); 10 New York Rules and Regulations (NYRR)
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Historically, there was concern about the medical definition
of death, which centered on science's inability to accurately
diagnose death. 6 The traditional legal definition of death was
the cessation of cardio-pulmonary function. 7 It seems as if there
was little controversy over this definition of death because
cardiopulmonary death was the best definition that medical
science could provide.'8
As technology developed, particularly transplantation
technology, the need to define death more accurately intensified.
During the late 1960's and early 1970's, a debate raged about the
proper definition of death in light of advanced technological
capabilities that allowed successful organ transplants. 9 Kansas
was the first state to adopt the brain death standard by statute
in 1970.20 In 1980, a committee acting for the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law drafted the
UDDA. Under the UDDA, 'a]n individual who has sustained
§400.16(e)(3)(2006) (requiring that hospital policy include "a procedure for the reasonable
accommodation of the individual's religious or moral objection to the determination as
expressed by the individual, or by the next of kin or other person closest to the
individual").
15 But see Ralph Gaebler and Roger B. Dworkin, Legal Definitions of Death, 3
Encyclopedia of Forensic and Legal Medicine 191, 195-96 (2005) ("The American situation
is less monolithic than [the approach of the UDDA] seems to suggest" for two reasons:
"[flirst, the Uniform Act itself provides different criteria for determining whether a
person is dead without specifying the circumstances in which one or the other criterion is
used .... More importantly, many issues that seem to revolve around the question of
whether a person is dead are not resolved by the statutes.").
16 Martin S. Pernick, Back From the Grave: Recurring Controversies Over Defining
and Diagnosing Death in History, in Richard M. Zaner, ed, Death: Beyond Whole-Brain
Criteria 17, 17-61 (Kluwer 1988) (recognizing that while there were many disagreements
over the medical definition of death, classical Greek physicians "believed that death could
begin in the lungs, brain or heart, but that the heart alone served as the seat of life"
while in the Hebrew tradition an absence of breath signaled death).
17 Time of Death: Medicolegal Considerations §2, 16 Am Jur Proof of Facts 2d 87, 96
(1978).
18 It is interesting to note that legal definitions of death, at least since the late
nineteenth century, rely heavily on determinations of death made by the medical field.
See Henry Campbell Black, A Dictionary of Law 334-335 (West 1st ed 1891) (defining
death as "[tihe extinction of life; the departure of the soul from the body; defined by
physicians as a total stoppage of the circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the
animal and vital functions consequent thereon, such as respiration, pulsation, etc."). This
edition of Black's Law Dictionary also distinguishes between natural death and civil
death. Natural death is "the extinction of life," whereas civil death occurs when a "person
is not actually dead, but is adjudged so by the law, as when a person is banished or
abjures the realm, or enters into a monastery." Id.
19 Alexander Morgan Capron and Leon Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards
for Determining Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U Pa L Rev 87 (1972-
73) (noting some of the controversy and proposing a statutory definition of death).
20 Barry R. Furrow, et al, Health Law §16-4 at 675 (West 1995). For the text of the
current statute, see Kan Stat Ann 77-205 (1989).
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either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory
functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the
entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead."2 Death was to
be determined in accordance with acceptable medical
standards,22 meaning that the medical criteria for death were
determined by physicians, not lawyers.23 The UDDA has since
been adopted in all fifty states,24 although in certain states it has
been adopted in a modified form.
While the adoption of a brain death standard is now
considered fairly uncontroversial, two states, New York and New
Jersey, provide relief from the brain death standard when
religious beliefs collide with the UDDA definition of death .25 New
Jersey law provides that:
[t]he death of an individual shall not be declared upon the
basis of neurological criteria . . . when the licensed
physician authorized to declare death, has reason to
believe, on the basis of the information in the individual's
available medical records, or information provided by a
member of the individual's family or any other person
knowledgeable about the individual's personal religious
beliefs that such a declaration would violate the personal
religious beliefs of the individual. In these cases, death
shall be declared . . . solely upon the basis of cardio-
respiratory criteria .... 26
21 12A UIA 593 (1996).
22 Id.
23 For example, in adopting the UDDA, the Washington Supreme Court explained
this distinction as follows:
Death is both a legal and medical question. Traditionally, the law has regarded
the question of at what moment a person died as a question of fact to be
determined by expert medical testimony. However, recognizing that the law has
independent interests in defining death which may be lost when deference to
medicine is complete, courts have established standards which, although based
on medical knowledge, define death as a matter of law. Thus, the law has
adopted standards of death but has turned to physicians for the criteria by
which a particular standard is met.
In re Welfare of Bowman, 617 P2d 731, 734 (Wash 1980) (citation omitted).
24 Some states adopted the UDDA by statute and others adopted it via case law.
25 New Jersey and New York probably allow these religious accommodations in part
because they have large Jewish populations. Some members of the Jewish community
only believe in a cardio-pulmonary definition of death. See Michael A. Grodin, Religious
Exemptions: Brain Death and Jewish Law, 36 J Church & State 357, 368-70 (1994).
26 NJSA 26:6A-5 (1996).
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New Jersey state courts have not yet addressed the
interpretation of this statute in a published opinion.
New York regulatory law also allows for religious
accommodation in the determination of death." The New York
regulation is similar to the UDDA in that it provides for
alternate definitions of death-both cardiopulmonary death and
total brain death. It is unique in that it makes exceptions for
people who have religious objections to declarations of death by
neurological criteria.28 The regulation requires that each hospital
"establish and implement a written policy regarding
determination of death" that includes, in part, "[a] procedure for
the reasonable accommodation of the individual's religious or
moral objection to the determination as expressed by the
individual or by the next of kin or other person closest to the
individual."29 There are only two cases that mention this
provision, one that addressed the constitutionally of the
regulations but was ultimately dismissed as moot,3" and one that
held that, while the hospital's written policy failed to provide for
a reasonable religious accommodation as required by the
regulation, it did "afford the baby's parents with 'reasonable
accommodation' in light of their religious and moral beliefs."3
27 10 NYRR §400.16(e)(3)(2006).
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 In Alvarado v New York City Health & Hosp Corp, 547 NYS2d 190 (NY Sup Ct
1989), vacated and appeal dismissed as academic by Alvarado v City of New York, et al,
550 NYS2d 353 (NY App Div 1990), a newborn boy was diagnosed as brain dead two days
after birth, but his family, Spanish-speaking Jehovah's Witnesses, insisted on keeping
him on life support. Approximately two weeks later the diagnosis was confirmed as
irreversible and the hospital informed the parents that it would remove the baby's
respirator in accordance with New York law unless the parents could obtain a court
order. Id. The Alvarados immediately petitioned the court for an order requiring the
hospital to maintain life support, arguing that the relevant New York regulation was
unconstitutional because it infringed on the baby's right to live and because the
regulation failed to put a process in place for challenges to the hospital's determination of
brain death. Id at 197. The court found that §400.16 was constitutional and determined
that the hospital had complied with it because "the Alvarados were notified before a
determination was' made, were given an opportunity to obtain an independent medical
evaluation, and were offered a chance to have the matter discussed with religious leaders
and friends." Id at 198. The court extended the order restraining the hospital from
discontinuing life support systems for seven days, giving the family time to find another
facility to take the child. Id. The decision was appealed, but before the court considered
the appeal the parties entered into a consent order that vacated the original decision
because the hospital had determined, based on new medical evidence, that the child was
not dead. See Alvarado v City ofNew York, et al, 550 NYS2d 353 (NY App Div 1990).
31 In In the Matter of Long Island Jewish Med Center, 641 NYS2d 989 (NY Sup Ct
1996), the hospital wanted to remove life support after a five-month-old baby was
declared brain dead. The parents, an anesthesiologist and an attorney, argued that the
hospital failed to comply with §400.16 because the hospital did not have a written policy
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Laws which require religious accommodations, while
sensitive to religious beliefs, are not the best way to proceed in
determinations of death. While all of the reported cases dealing
with religious accommodations involve infants, it is easy to
imagine the religious accommodation being used for devious
purposes when an adult life is at issue. For example, family
members might use the religious accommodation to keep a loved
one on a ventilator through the end of a particular tax year 2 or
to keep an insured person alive while finishing out a waiting
period on a life insurance policy.33 Gaming of such a system could
be rampant and the moral hazards associated with such a legal
rule could be expensive. While it might be nice to recognize
religious beliefs in determining both life and death, the law
cannot accept inconsistent definitions of death or uncertainty in
the law.34
So far this paper has discussed the legal definition of death
primarily for the purposes of declaring someone dead and filling
out a death certificate. But the legal definition of death is
implicated in other situations as well. For example, several
criminal defendants charged with murder have argued that they
should be absolved of the crime because while they may have
injured a victim by rendering him brain dead, the removal of the
on the determination of death. Id at 991. The court found that although the hospital's
written policy did not provide for a reasonable religious accommodation as required by
the regulation, it did give the parents a "reasonable accommodation." Id at 992. This
finding was based on five stated facts: (1) the parents were kept informed of the baby's
condition, (2) the doctors were available for consultation with the anesthesiologist father,
(3) the hospital encouraged the parents to seek a second opinion and were prepared to
cooperate with any expert consulted, (4) the hospital was willing to transfer the baby to
another facility, and (5) when the hospital determined the baby was brain dead it did not
simply pull the plug, but sought judicial intervention to give the parents a forum to
express their position. Id. The court granted the hospital the authority to withdraw the
baby's life support, but concluded, "[t]his Court sympathizes with the religious
convictions of the parents but under the circumstances, the law of this state requires the
ruling made by this court." Id. The court then stayed the withdrawal of life support for
seven days, most likely to give the parents a chance to have the child transferred to
another facility. Id.
32 The estate tax is set to expire in 2009 and attorneys practicing trusts and estates
often joke that 2009 may be the year to die.
33 Some life insurance policies have a waiting period before the benefits become
available. For example, if someone is brain dead because of a suicide attempt and the
policy has a provision that does not cover death by suicide within two years of the policy's
purchase, it may make sense for the family to keep the loved one on a ventilator even
though they have been declared brain dead.
34 Furrow, Health Law at § 16-9, 680 (cited in note 20) (opining that "[jiust as we do
not allow individuals to decide to choose their age by counting from either the moment of
birth or the moment of conception, whichever is most consistent with their own religious
views, we ought not allow them to choose the time of their death based on the application
of alternative definitions of death").
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victim from life support was the actual cause of death. While it is
true that many brain dead patients indefinitely retain cardio-
pulmonary functioning with the assistance of life support, courts
have uniformly dismissed such arguments.3 5 In fact, such an
argument has never been successful.36 The brain death definition
of death as used in the criminal context is similarly applied in
wrongful death cases.37 Furthermore, personal injury suits
brought on behalf of brain dead decedents with cardio-pulmonary
functioning have been rejected because personal injury suits
must be filed before a decedent's death.38 All of these legal
understandings of death comport with the UDDA. And for the
most part, except for a few rare instances such as the prolonged
35 See, for example, People v Elo, 472 NE2d 286 (NY App Ct 1994) (ruling that the
defendant's conduct caused the victim's death and that the organ transplant procedures
after the victim's entire brain had irreversibly ceased to function were not superseding
causes of death); State v Watson, 467 A2d 590 (NJ Super Ct App Div 1983) (ruling that
death was not caused by turning off the respirator, but from defendant's acts); State v
Meints, 322 NW2d 809 (Neb 1982) (ruling that proof of brain death is sufficient as proof
of the victim's death in a homicide case); Swafford v State, 421 NE2d 596 (Ind 1981)
(ruling that for purposes of homicide law, proof of the death of the victim was established
by proof of the irreversible cessation of the victim's brain functions); State v Inger, 292
NW2d 119 (Iowa 1980) (rejecting a defendant's claim that the state must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the victim was dead within the meaning of a state brain-death
statute when an artificial means of support was removed); State v -yerm, 603 P2d 74
(Ariz 1979) (ruling that gunshot wounds, not removal of the support systems, were the
proximate cause of death); State vHolselaw, 257 SE2d 650 (NC App Ct 1979) (upholding
a jury conviction upon finding defendant's act was a contributing factor that proximately
caused the victim's death, even if the doctor was negligent); State v Johnson, 381 NE2d
637 (Ohio 1978) (ruling that one who inflicts injury upon another is criminally
responsible for that person's death, regardless of whether a different doctor would not
have removed the life support systems); Cranmore v State, 271 NW2d 402 (Wis 1978)
(affirming that the jury could reasonably be convinced that death occurred before the
physician conducted a nephrectomy, according to either a blood circulation and
pulmonary activity definition or a brain death definition); Commonwealth v Golston, 366
NE2d 744 (Mass 1977), cert denied 434 US 1039 (1978) (ruling that the trial judge had
correctly accepted the medical definition of brain death, and that in any case such error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
36 Barry R. Furrow, et al, Bioethics: Health Care Law and Ethics 207 (West 2001).
37 While there do not appear to be cases where the defendants tried to dismiss
wrongful death claims on the basis that the brain dead decedent could have been kept
alive indefinitely on life support, there are several cases allowing wrongful death claims
to go forward even though the decedent was withdrawn from life support by his or her
family. See, for example, Mineroff v Siber, 710 NYS2d 623 (NY App Div 2000) (denying
summary judgment to defendants in an action brought by decedent's estate to recover
damages for decedent's conscious pain and suffering and wrongful death due to medical
malpractice); Seippel-Cress v Lackamp, 23 SW3d 660 (Mo App Ct 2000) (overturning a
directed verdict for plaintiffs failure to adequately define the legal standard of care and
remanding for determination of whether wrongful death had occurred).
38 See, for example, Bassie v Obstetrics & Gynecology Assoc ofNWAlabama, 828 S2d
280, 283 (Ala 2002) (affirming the trial court's dismissal of the decedent's personal injury
claims because she was legally brain dead before her claims were filed even though her
respiratory and cardiac functioning were being successfully maintained by life support).
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absence of a person39 and civil death,4" death is defined uniformly
throughout the law in a relatively uncontroversial manner.
B. The Legal Definition of Life
Legally defining life in the United States has always been
complicated.4' In addition to focusing on the few cases and
statutes that clearly define life, this section explores how courts
define life implicitly. For example, courts often define human
beings and persons in the context of homicide and wrongful
death statutes. While the legal definition of a human being or a
person may seem, at first, to have little to do with legally
defining life, using these terms in the context of a wrongful death
claim or a homicide statute necessarily implies that the person
or human being is alive. Because many of the cases discussed
throughout this section focus on the early developmental stages
of life, it necessarily follows that every time something-a
fertilized human egg, an embryo, a fetus, or a newborn-is
defined as a person, that person has also been defined as living
(or else another person could not be tried for homicide, etc).42
39 A missing person is presumed to be alive until seven years have passed since the
person was last seen or heard from. After seven years, the presumption of life ceases and
the presumption of death arises. The person is considered to have legally died as of the
date of the presumption of death. Donovan v Major, 97 NE 231, 232 (Ili 1911). This
common law principle is the same in all states unless modified by statute. 25A CJS Death
§8 (2002). For an example of a state modifying the common law presumptions see NY
Estates, Powers and Trusts Law §2-1.7 (McKinney 1998) (allowing for a presumption of
death after a person has been missing continuously for three years).
40 Civil death occurs when a "person is not actually dead, but is adjudged so by the
law, as when a person is banished or abjures the realm, or enters into a monastery."
Henry Campbell Black, A Dictionary of Law 335 (West 1st ed 1891). See also Special
Projects: Civi Disabilities, 23 Vand L Rev 931, 1083-86 (1969-70) (noting that some early
state laws considered prisoners sentenced to life to be civilly dead).
41 Even Black's Law Dictionary does not clearly define life. For example, the first
edition of Black's Law Dictionary, published in 1891, gives two definitions of life. Life is
first defined as "[t]hat state of animals and plants, or of an organized being, in which its
natural functions and motions are performed, or in which its organs are capable of
performing their functions." Henry Campbell Black, A Dictionary of Law 720 (West 1st ed
1891). See also Black's Law Dictionary 727 (2d ed 1910). Second, life is defined as "[t]he
sum of the forces by which death is resisted." Henry Campbell Black, A Dictionary of Law
720 (West 1st ed 1891). See also Black's Law Dictionary 727 (2d ed 1910). Neither of
these definitions clearly defines when life begins. The first definition focuses on the
"natural functions and motions" of an "organized being," perhaps suggesting that life
begins at quickening. The second definition of life simply defines it as the absence of
death, thereby recognizing that life and death are mutually exclusive.
42 There are some apparent exceptions to this broad generalization. For example,
feticide is a distinct crime from homicide that involves the killing of a fetus. Because
feticide statutes are explicit that the killing of a fetus is the criminal act involved, there is
an implicit understanding that the killing of a fetus is not the killing of a person. In this
way, feticide is akin to crimes that punish the killing of non-humans, such as animals,
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Exploring the explicit and implicit definitions of life highlights
both how difficult defining life can be and how inconsistent and
controversial legal definitions of life are. Following is a brief
overview of fetuses' legal status throughout American history,
focusing in particular on how life is legally defined in the context
of legal recordkeeping, wrongful death cases, homicide statutes,
and abortion.
1. Vital Records.
Statutes concerning vital records, such as birth and death
certificates, are one of the few places where life is explicitly
defined by law. For example, in Arizona "birth" or "live birth"
means "the complete expulsion or extraction of a product of
human conception from its mother, irrespective of the duration of
the pregnancy, that shows evidence of life ... such as breathing,
heartbeat, umbilical cord pulsation or definite voluntary muscle
movement after expulsion or extraction. . . ."' Alabama adopts
similar definitions of life, but notes that "[h]eartbeats are to be
distinguished from transient cardiac contractions; respirations
are to be distinguished from fleeting respiratory efforts or
gasps."' While these statutes do not necessarily preclude legal
life prior to birth, they do explicitly distinguish between life and
death at the instant of birth in a way that significantly differs
from the legal definition of death. These statutes do not consider
the brain functioning of the newborn. Instead, the definition of
live birth focuses on older notions of life such as breathing and
cardiac rhythm.
In some ways, these definitions of life harken back to an era
where children had to be born alive to be vested with certain
important legal rights, such as the right to bring a wrongful
death suit for injury sustained in utero.45 The vital statistics
definition of live birth is also significant because it marks an
endpoint in legal thinking. While some philosophers have argued
that full moral status should not attach to newborns who lack
self-awareness,46 there does not appear to be any Anglo-Saxon
that the law wishes to accord some moral status.
43 Ariz Rev Stat Ann §36-301(3)(2005) (defining "fetal death" for purposes of state
public health registration officials and agencies).
44 Ala Code §22-9A-1(7)(2004) (defining "live birth" for the purpose of collecting vital
statistics by the state board of health).
45 See note 54 and accompanying text.
46 Peter Singer, Practical Et ics 122-23 (Cambridge 1979).
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legal definition of life that denies that an infant born with a
heart beat and respiratory function is legally alive.a7
2. Wrongful Death.
The treatment of fetuses in wrongful death cases varies
dramatically from state to state and over the course of time.
Traditionally common law did not allow wrongful death recovery
for an injury that occurred in the womb.48 This rule applied even
if the fetus lived for a short period of time after its birth, but died
as a result of its prenatal injuries.49 The rationale for the
common law approach might be two-fold.50 First, the rule served
primarily an evidentiary function. For example, prior to advent
of modern medicine, it was difficult to determine whether the
harm to the fetus was the result of an alleged injury or a natural
occurrence.5' Second, the child was often regarded as part of the
mother and not an independent being.52
Today, there are three common approaches to fetal wrongful
death cases.53 Depending upon the jurisdiction, recovery for the
47 Unless, of course, the infant is determined after a series of tests to be brain dead.
48 See Dietrich v Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass 14, 15 (1884) (overruled)
(holding that a fetus that was injured in the womb but survived birth for ten to fifteen
minutes could not be the subject of a wrongful death suit). In deciding this case Judge
Holmes noted the English rule (which eventually took hold in the United States): "if a
woman is quick with child, and takes a potion, or if a man beats her, and the child is born
alive and dies of the potion or battery, this is murder." Id.
49 Id at 15. See also Buel v United Rys Co of St Louis, 154 SW 71, 73 (Mo 1913)
(reversed).
50 Consider Mamta K Shah, Note, Inconsistencies in the Legal Status of an Unborn
Child: Recognition of a Fetus as Potential Life, 29 Hofstra L Rev 931, 936-938 (Spring
2001).
51 See Frank A. Manning, Fetal Medicine: Principles and Practice (Appleton & Lange
1995) (noting that "[pirior to the era of modern fetal medicine ushered in by the new
ability to visualize the fetus and its activities using high-resolution dynamic ultrasound
imaging methods, assessment of fetal condition was highly limited, being restricted to
those few fetal biophysical variables that could be assessed from the maternal subjective
reports, by observation of the maternal abdomen, or by listening to the fetal heart"). X-
ray pelvimetry was first used to diagnosis difficult obstetric cases in 1898 and was not in
general use until the 1930s. Judith Walzer Leavitt, Brought to Bed: Childbearing in
America 1750 to 1950 267 (Oxford 1986). A laboratory test for determining pregnancy
was not even reported in the literature until 1926. Id at 268.
52 See AlHaire v St Luke's Hospital, 76 Il1 App 441, 450 (Ill App 1898) (overruled)
(stating that the doctrine that "an unborn child may be regarded as in esse for some
purposes when for its benefit, is a mere legal fiction, which.., has not been indulged in
by the courts of common law to the extent of allowing an action by an infant for injuries
occasioned before its birth"). In esse means "[i]n being. Actually existing. Distinguished
from in posse, which means 'that which is not, but may be.' A child before birth is in
posse; after birth, in esse." Black's Lawlictionary 535 (West abridged 6th ed 1991).
53 See Shah, 29 Hofstra L Rev at 939-51 (cited in note 50) ("Three major approaches
have developed in the attempt to define the term 'person' when applying a wrongful death
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wrongful death of a fetus may be allowed (1) if the child is born
alive,54 (2) if the fetus is viable at its death,55 or (3) for the death
of any unborn fetus, including pre-viable fetuses.56
Of these three approaches, the majority position allows
recovery for the wrongful death of a viable fetus. States taking
this position generally define viability as the ability of the fetus
to live independently of its mother.5" Minnesota, the first state to
statute to a fetus: a fetus that is born alive; a viable fetus; and a non-viable unborn
fetus."). Some, however, suggest that there are at least four different approaches to
considering fetal life in construing wrongful death statutes. See Bolin v Winger4 764
NE2d 201, 205 n 6 (Ind 2002) (distinguishing Georgia from the other pre-viability states
because of its quickening requirement). For a general discussion of wrongful death cases
involving fetuses, consider Sheldon R. Shapiro, Right to Maintain Action or to Recover
Damages for Death of Unborn Child, 84 ALR 3d 411 (1978 & Supp 2001); Daniel S.
Meade, Wrongful Death and the Unborn Child: Should Viabihty Be a Prerequisite for a
Cause ofAction 14 J Contemp Health L & Pol'y 421, 426-44 (1998).
54 Approximately ten states follow the born alive rule. Bolin v Wingert, 764 NE2d
201, 205 n 4 (Ind 2002). See, for example, Sosebee v Hillcrest Baptist Med Ctr, 8 SW3d
427 (Tex Ct App 1999) (noting that "Itlhe Supreme Court of Texas has uniformly held for
almost thirty years that an unborn child has no cause of action for prenatal injuries
unless the child is born alive"); Hernandez v Garwood, 390 S2d 357 (Fla 1980) (noting
that no cause of action could be maintained for the death of an unborn child); Endresz v
Friedberg, 248 NE2d 901 (NY 1969) (stating that the Court of Appeals of New York had
already decided that "a wrongful death action may not be maintained for the death of an
unborn child").
55 The majority of states only allow recovery where the fetus is viable at death. Sarah
Loquist, Note, The Wrongful Death of a Fetus: Erasing the Barrier Between Viability and
Nonviability, 36 Washburn L J 259, 287 (1997).
56 A minority of states allow wrongful death actions to be brought for the death of
any fetus, viable or non-viable. See, for example, Wiersma v Maple Leaf Farms, 543
NW2d 787, 792 (SD 1996) ("Parents may seek redress regardless of whether their unborn
child was viable."); Connor vMonkem Co, 898 SW2d 89, 93 (Mo 1995) ("[W]e hold that a
wrongful death claim may be stated for a nonviable unborn child.. . ."); Farley v Sartin,
466 SE2d 522, 534 (W Va 1995) (holding that West Virginia's wrongful death statute
applies to non-viable fetuses). But see Shirley v Bacon, 267 SE2d 809, 810 (Ga App Ct
1980) ("In Georgia an action for the wrongful death of an unborn child may be maintained
if the child was 'quick' at its death .... ."). Also, there do appear to be limits as to what
counts as a non-viable fetus under some wrongful death laws. See Jeter v Mayo Clinic
Arizona, 121 P3d 1256, 1261 (Ariz App Div 2005) (holding that a "cryopreserved, three-
day-old eight-cell pre-embryo is not a 'person' for whose loss or destruction the Jeters can
recover under Arizona's wrongful death statutes" and refusing to "interpret the term
'person' under the wrongful death statutes to conception outside a woman's womb").
5' Wrongful Death of Fetus §1 19 Am Jur Proof of Facts 3d 107, 113 (2004) (stating
that at least thirty-six states allow for wrongful death claims to proceed if the fetus is
viable when injured and dies as a result of these injuries).
58 See, for example, Summerfield v Superior Court In and For Maricopa County, 698
P2d 712, 722 (Ariz 1985) (stating that "the common law now recognizes that it is the
ability of the fetus to sustain life independently of the mother's body that should
determine when tort law should recognize it as a 'person' whose loss is compensable to
the survivors"); Mitchell v Couch, 285 SW2d 901, 905 (Ky 1955) ("[T]he expression 'Viable
fetus' means the child has reached such a state of development that it can presently live
outside the female body as well as within it. A fetus generally becomes a viable child
between the sixth and seventh month of its existence . . . ."). But other states define
viability more specifically. See, for example, Brfitt v Sears, 277 NE2d 20, 26 (Ind App Ct
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allow recovery for the wrongful death of a viable fetus,
exemplifies this focus on fetal independence:
[A fetus] has, if viable, its own bodily form and members,
manifests all of the anatomical characteristics of
individuality, possesses its own circulatory, vascular and
excretory systems and is capable now of being ushered
into the visible world.
The absence of precedent should afford no refuge to those
who by their wrongful act, if such be proved, have invaded
the right of an individual.59
While most states, like Minnesota, recognize fetal
independence at viability, the states still following the born alive
rule recognize fetal independence at birth. 0 One distinction
between these differing views of fetal independence is that the
live birth rule requires actual, physical independence while the
viability rule requires only a likelihood of independence.61 The
preference for viability in the wrongful death cases, as opposed to
the preference for the live birth rule in criminal cases, suggests
that the legal system is less likely to impose criminal liability
when the likelihood of the fetus's natural outcome is still
uncertain. Additionally, prosecution under a homicide statute
suggests that the victim has a right not to be killed while the
filing of a wrongful death claim by the decedent's heirs suggests
that the heirs have a right to be compensated for their loss.62
1971) (allowing a wrongful death claim for an unborn child "who has been 280 days in
gestation" because it has a "legal being and legal personality distinct from that of its
mother").
Note that viability in Mitchell v Couch is defined as occurring between the sixth
and seventh month, or between the twenty-fourth and twenty-eighth week. Given
advances in medical technology fetuses are now thought to be viable at approximately
twenty-two weeks. For definitions of viability in the abortion context see Webster v
Reproductive Health Services 492 US 490, 515-516 (1989) (noting that the viability-
testing provision of the Missouri Act "creates what is essentially a presumption of
viability at 20 weeks").
59 Verkennes v Corniea, 38 NW2d 838, 840-41 (Minn 1949) (citing Bonbrest v Kotz,
65 F Supp 138, 140-42 (D DC 1946)).
so Compare Duncan v Flynn, 342 S2d 123, 125 (Fla 1977) (noting that a fetus does
not have an independent existence from its mother until it has been completely expelled
from the mother's body) with Summerield, 698 P2d at 722 (stating that "it is the ability
of the fetus to sustain life independently of the mother's body that should determine
when tort law should recognize it as a 'person' whose loss is compensable to the
survivors") (emphasis added).
61 Viability does not guarantee that the fetus will be capable of living independently
of its mother. Rather, it is simply the stage in fetal development when a fetus has a
likelihood of surviving birth with the assistance of medical technology.
62 Wrongful death claims are claims brought by the decedent's heirs for the loss of
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A few states are beginning to allow recovery for the wrongful
death of a pre-viable fetus. Some of these states allow recovery
regardless of the fetus's developmental stage; the rationale for
this rule is often that life begins at conception." Other states
that allow wrongful death claims for the death of a pre-viability
fetus focus on whether the fetus was "quick."' Historically,
quickening occurred when the mother felt the child move.65
Some states, however, have redefined quickening. Georgia
courts, for example, have held that the mother need not actually
feel fetal movement in order to establish quickening.66 In Citron
v Ghaffai,67 a mother brought a wrongful death suit arguing
that she should recover for the loss of her eight-week-old fetus
even though the only movement detected from the fetus was a
heartbeat detected by a sonogram.6" The Georgia Court of
Appeals rejected her claim, holding that quickening meant the
sort of movement made by the fetus's arm or leg:
To hold otherwise would make the concept meaningless.
Presumably, with the right equipment, movement
resulting simply from the biological process of fetal
development could be detected from the very onset of
pregnancy. Therefore, were we to adopt the Ghaffaris'
argument that a heartbeat demonstrates quickening
because it can be seen on a sonogram, we would
effectively be recognizing a cause of action for wrongful
death at any point during pregnancy. This would be a
marked shift in the treatment of unborn children under
Georgia law and may more properly be the subject of
legislative action.69
the decedent while survival claims are claims brought on behalf of the decedent for his or
her injuries while alive. There do not appear to be any cases distinguishing between
wrongful death and survival claims where the death of a viable fetus is concerned. It
appears, therefore, that if a viable fetus constitutes a person for the purposes of a
wrongful death claim, he or she might also constitute a person for the purposes of a
survival action. This result, however, seems troubling. Perhaps wrongful death claims
should be allowed for the death of a viable fetus, but survival claims should not.
6 See note 56 and accompanying text.
64 Id.
65 See for example, Evans vPeople, 49 NY 86, 90 (NY 1872) ("Although there may be
life before quickening, all the authorities agree that a child is not 'quick' until the mother
has felt the child alive within her.").
66 Shirley vBacon, 267 SE2d 809, 811 (Ga App 1980).
67 542 SE2d 555 (Ga App 2000).
68 Id at 555.
69 Id at 557.
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While not specifically defining when quickening occurs, the court
rejected the idea that quickening could begin before the eighth
week of gestation. This rule recognizes "that advances in
technology allow a physician to detect an unborn child's
movement before a mother may actually recognize it," and yet
requires evidence that the fetus is at least capable of limb
movement.70 If it is not clear whether the fetus was "quick" at
the time of its death, this becomes a question of fact for the
jury.71
In the wrongful death context, conception, quickening,
viability, and live birth are all potential definitions of life. How
life is defined for this single legal cause of action varies widely
between jurisdictions and across time.
3. Homicide and Feticide.
There is also disagreement among jurisdictions as to what
counts as life for the purpose of homicide and feticide statutes.
At common law, a person could not be criminally convicted for
killing a child in utero unless the child was born alive and then
died shortly thereafter.72 To prove a live birth the child must
have attained independent circulation and existence from its
mother.7' The child, then considered an independent being, was
capable of receiving legal protection under the homicide statutes.
Implicit in the born alive rule is an understanding that an
unborn fetus is not legally alive.
The born alive rule in homicide cases functions in the same
way that the born alive rule works in most wrongful death cases,
and it is not without its practical explanations. First, the born
alive rule serves to alleviate evidentiary difficulties.74 Second,
fetuses were not viewed as independent beings until they were
physically and physiologically independent.75  While some
wrongful death cases consider quickening or viability to be the
moment of fetal independence, the stakes are much higher when
70 Id (discussing Shirley vBacon, 267 SE2d 809).
71 Citron, 542 SE2d at 557.
72 See Shah, 29 Hofstra L Rev at 936-38 (cited in note 50). See also Canfield v State,
56 Ind 168, 170 (Ind 1877) ("To support an indictment for infanticide, at common law, it
must be clearly proved that the child was wholly born, and was born alive, having an
independent circulation, and existence.") (citing John Wilder May, 3 Greenleaf on
Evidence §136 (Little, Brown 13th ed 1876).
73 State v Winthrop, 43 Iowa 519, 520-21 (Iowa 1876).
74 See notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
75 Id.
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criminal conviction is possible because the alleged perpetrator
might be facing jail time or death. Perhaps this is why courts
tended to favor the more stringent born alive rule in homicide
cases.
While the common law born alive rule is still law in many
jurisdictions,76 it is not the rule everywhere. Some states have
brought prosecutions for the killing of an unborn fetus under
state homicide statutes by recognizing the fetus as a person.77
Other states have refused to recognize an unborn fetus as a
person under the state's homicide statute and have instead
enacted feticide statutes that make it a crime to kill an unborn
human fetus.78 Feticide, the killing of a human fetus,79 is
significantly different from homicide where the court recognizes
76 Shah, 29 Hofstra L Rev at 951-59 (cited in note 50) (explaining that "[c]ourts have
advocated continued acceptance of the Born Alive Rule when interpreting murder
statutes, despite advances in medical technology that have weakened the rationale
underlying the common law approach"). One court has disallowed a manslaughter charge
even where the baby was born alive. See State vAiwohi, 123 P3d 1210, 1225 (Haw 2005)
(reversing a mother's conviction for manslaughter after she recklessly smoked crystal
methamphetamine at full term causing her son's death two days after his birth because a
fetus is not a person within the state's manslaughter statute and the harm of the
methamphetamine was imposed on the fetus and not the baby). Aiwobi is an unusual
case because most homicide cases follow the born alive rule, which allows a person to be
convicted of homicide if the fetus is born alive even if the fetus dies shortly after birth.
See, for example, People v Hal, 557 NYS2d 879 (NY App Div 1990) (holding the
defendant guilty of second degree manslaughter when he shot the victim's mother,
causing premature delivery, and there was evidence the victim was born alive); Ranger v
State, 290 SE2d 63, 66 (Ga 1982) (holding the defendant guilty of felony murder when he
shot the victim's mother, causing premature delivery, and the victim was born alive and
died twelve hours after delivery). It appears that there may be a series of cases that do
not apply the murder or abortion statutes to mothers who cause death to their fetus even
if the fetus if born alive before it dies. See for example, State v Ashley, 701 S2d 338 (Fla
1997) (holding that the state could not prosecute a teenage woman who shot herself in the
abdomen during the third trimester of pregnancy because the state homicide and
abortion statutes did not abrogate the common law doctrine of immunity for pregnant
women causing injury or death to their fetuses).
77 See, for example, Commonwealth v Morris, 142 SW3d 654, 660 (Ky 2004)
(overruling a 1983 case maintaining the born alive rule and holding that a "viable fetus"
is a "human being" under Kentucky's homicide statutes); State v Holcomb, 956 SW2d
286, 289-90 (Mo Ct App 1997) (holding that an "unborn child," whether viable or not, is a
"person" under the state's first degree murder statute); Hughes v State, 868 P2d 730, 731
(Okla Crim App 1994) (holding that an "unborn viable fetus" is a "human being" under
Oklahoma's homicide statute); Commonwealth v Cass, 467 NE2d 1324, 1326 (Mass 1984)
(holding that a viable fetus is a person for purposes of the state vehicular homicide
statute); State vHorne, 319 SE2d 703, 704 (SC 1984) (holding that a fetus is a person for
the purposes of criminal law).
78 See 40 CJS Homicide §44 (2005) (noting that the killing of a fetus is a "specifically
designated type of murder" under some statutes, included in the definition of murder in
some statutes, and "excluded from the reach of"some statutes).
79 Feticide is defined as "[t]he act or an instance of killing a fetus, usually by
assaulting and battering the mother; an intentionally induced miscarriage." Black's Law
Dictionary636 (West 7th ed 1999).
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the fetus as a person because feticide statutes implicitly
recognize that fetuses have a lesser moral standing than
persons."0
Generally there are two types of feticide statutes, those
allowing conviction for pre-viability death and those allowing
conviction only for post-viability death." Most feticide statutes
require that the fetus be viable. The effect of a viability
requirement is that the battery of a pregnant woman resulting in
the death of her eighteen-week-old fetus, which is not yet viable,
results in a charge of battery upon the woman and not battery
and feticide.
There may be a trend to allow prosecution for feticide
anytime after conception. At least one state, Minnesota, has
allowed prosecutors to bring homicide charges for the death of a
non-viable fetus.82 California has held that viability is not
necessary for prosecution under its feticide statute, and instead
requires that the prosecution be able to prove that the fetus has
progressed beyond the embryonic state of seven to eight weeks
when most of the major structures of the fetus are outlined.83
In sum, the feticide and homicide statutes vary widely with
respect to their definition of life. Some states still adhere to the
common law born alive rule, while other states use quickening,
80 Fetuses were found to be persons for the purpose of wrongful death statutes at
approximately the same time feticide statutes appeared. Recovery under a wrongful
death statute was first allowed for an unborn fetus in 1949. Verkennes v Corniea, 38
NW2d 838 (Minn 1949). And feticide statutes came into being around 1950.
In some ways, feticide is more similar to a theoretical statute prohibiting the
unlawful killing of an animal than it is to homicide. Persons who commit feticide are
recognized as committing a lesser crime, with a substantially lighter penalty. See Shah,
29 Hofstra L Rev at 964-65 (cited in note 50) (noting that "[b]ecause feticide statutes are
intended to protect an unborn child as a 'potential life,' they do not provide a fetus the
same protection afforded to a person under criminal law"). In the same way, the unlawful
killing of an animal may be punished as wrong, but not as severely as the unlawful
killing of a human being because the animal's moral status is seen as significant, but not
significant enough to warrant the same punishment as homicide.
Feticide statutes change the debate in which I am engaging because while they
define "life" in some abstract sense there is an explicit recognition that the life they are
defining and protecting is distinct from the life of a human being with full legal status.
This distinction, however, is not made in other areas of the law discussed in this section
of the paper.
81 Compare State vMerill, 450 NW 2d 318, 324 (Minn 1990) (allowing one man to be
prosecuted under Minnesota's feticide statute for the death of a pre-viable fetus where
the man killed the mother), with People v Shum, 512 NE2d 1183, 1198-99 (Ill 1987)
(recognizing that Illinois' feticide statute requires a finding of fetal viability).
82 Merrill, 450 NW2d at 324. The perpetrator in this case was prosecuted under
Minnesota's feticide statute.
83 People v Davis, 872 P2d 591, 599 (Cal 1994) (recognizing that life at seven to eight
weeks is unique because it falls in between the traditionally recognized beginnings of life,
conception and quickening or between conception and viability).
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viability, the outlining of fetal structures, or conception as the
point at which the state protects fetal life in the criminal context.
4. Abortion Standards.
In the early 1800s, American abortion practices were
governed by English common law; abortions, to the extent they
were prosecuted at all, were punishable as misdemeanors prior
to quickening.' The common law rule, therefore, suggested that
legal life began at quickening. By 1900, almost every state had a
law forbidding abortion at any stage of pregnancy. 85 While
exceptions were made when the mother's health was at risk,
determinations as to when .an abortion was warranted were left
to physicians' discretion. 86 This transformation suggests that the
definition of legal life implicitly began to focus on conception as
the moment when life emerges.87 From 1900 to 1959, there was
little public debate about the indications necessary for a legal
abortion or the legality of abortions being performed.
88
Beginning in 1959, there was a movement to legalize the
abortions that were being performed under the guise of medical
judgment.89 Colorado was the first state to pass such reform,
followed closely by North Carolina and California. ° In 1967, for
example, California passed the Therapeutic Abortion Act, which
"permit[ted] termination of pregnancy when there [wa]s
substantial risk that its continuation would gravely impair the
physical or mental health of the mother, or when the pregnancy
ha[d] resulted from rape or incest."9' The act explicitly left the
determination of whether an abortion should be available to the
84 Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood 14 (Univ Cal 1985).
85 Id at 15.
86 Id at 40.
87 Id at 24-27. One of Luker's main assertions is that physicians were the impetus
behind the "right-to-life" movement, and that this movement, while said to be premised
on new scientific technology, was actually an attempt to gain respect for the profession
while marginalizing non-physician medical practitioners. Luker, Abortion and the
Politics of Motherhood at 14-39 (cited in note 84).
88 Id at 40-65 (referring to 1900-1960 as "The Century of Silence"). Doctors during
this time were allowing all sorts of abortions on the basis of "medical judgment," even if a
strict construction of the abortion laws would have prohibited the abortions. Id at 68-69.
89 A strict constructionist view of California's abortion law at the time prohibited
abortions performed because of fetal injury, rape, mental harm to the mother, and
socioeconomic harms. Id at 68. See also Zad Leavy and Alan F. Charles, California's New
Therapeutic Abortion Act: An Analysis and Guide to Medical and Legal Procedure, 15
UCLA L Rev 1, 2 (1967-68) (citing the LA Daily Journal as reporting that abortion reform
bills were introduced into 28 states in 1967).
90 Leavy and Charles, 15 UCLA L Rev at 2 (cited in note 89).
91 Id at 2.
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physician in cases of "extreme medical need and great
hardship."92
When Roe v Wade93 was decided in 1973, twenty-eight states
allowed abortion only if it was necessary to save the life of the
mother.94 Eighteen states allowed abortions to save the life of the
mother and under other circumstances.9" The trend was toward
more lenient statutes, meaning that abortions could be
performed in the case of rape, incest, fetal abnormality, or a
substantial risk to the physical or mental health of the mother.96
What the wide range of abortion laws meant for the legal
definition of life prior to Roe v Wade is not entirely clear.97 It is
92 Id.
93 410 US 113 (1973).
94 Id at 118 n 2 (listing thirty states with laws that, like the Texas law at issue, made
it a crime to obtain an abortion unless the abortion was necessary to save the life of the
mother).
95 Id at 139-41. The law in the remaining states was unclear. Id. A majority of the
states allowing abortions more liberally adopted laws similar to §230.3 of the American
Law Institute Model Penal Code. Roe, 410 US 113. Section 230.3 of the American Law
Institute Penal Code provided that:
[a] licensed physician is justified in terminating a pregnancy if he believes there is
substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely impair the
physical or mental health of the mother or that the child would be born with grave
physical or mental defect, or that the pregnancy resulted from rape, incest, or other
felonious intercourse. All illicit intercourse with a girl below the age of 16 shall be
deemed felonious for purposes of this subsection. Justifiable abortions shall be
performed only in a licensed hospital except in case of emergency when hospital
facilities are unavailable....
No abortion shall be performed unless two physicians, one of whom may be the
person performing the abortion, shall have certified in writing the circumstances
which they believe to justify the abortion. Such certificate shall be submitted before
the abortion to the hospital where it is to be performed and, in the case of abortion
following felonious intercourse, to the prosecuting attorney or the police. Failure to
comply with any of the requirements of this Subsection gives rise to a presumption
that the abortion was unjustified.
ALI MPC §§230.3(2) & 230.3(3) (1980).
96 Roe, 410 US at 139-40.
97 The patchwork of abortion laws could be analyzed in at least two ways. One
possible view is that all states at the time of Roe v Wade defined legal ife as beginning at
conception, but some states considered the abortion of fetuses lawful if the mother's life
was at risk. Such an allowance could be justified on the basis of criminal defenses, such
as self-defense or necessity. For such an argument see Karen L. Bell, Toward a New
Analysis of the Abortion Debate, 33 Ariz L Rev 907 (1991). Other states considered the
termination of fetuses lawful under a broader range of circumstances. In essence, these
states recognized a greater number of justifications for abortion. A second interpretation
is that abortion laws recognized birth as the legal definition of life, but wanted to afford
some protection to fetuses nonetheless. These laws recognized potential life as something
lesser than full human life, yet just as worthy of legal protection. Just as the law protects
animals against unlawful killings, the law could be seen in some states prior to Roe as
protecting fetuses.
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clear, however, that there was a revolution of sorts taking place,
both morally and legally.
At the time of Roe v Wade, the wrongful death laws were
similarly confused, although the courts were beginning to focus
on viability as an important moment in fetal development.9" In
Roe v Wade, the Supreme Court ultimately adopted viability as
the "compelling point" in a pregnancy when the state has an
"important and legitimate interest in potential life," thereby
allowing the state to regulate or proscribe abortion after viability
"except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the
mother."99 While the Roe Court explicitly refused to adopt a
definition of life,' it did so implicitly.
In later cases, the Supreme Court pulled back from Rods
trimester approach,' but maintained that "whether viability
occurs at approximately 28 weeks, as was usual at the time of
Roe, at 23 to 24 weeks, as it sometimes does today, or at some
moment even slightly earlier in pregnancy, as it may if fetal
respiratory capacity can somehow be enhanced in the future[,]..
• the attainment of viability may continue to serve as the critical
fact .... ,,102 While the Supreme Court refused to explicitly define
life in Roe, the effect of its decision and later decisions was to
implicitly define legal life as beginning at viability as determined
by medical judgment, at least for the purpose of abortions.
IV. THE FORCED SYMMETRY APPROACH: A NEW WAY TO DISCUSS
LEGAL DEFINITIONS OF LIFE AND DEATH
Current legal definitions of life and death highlight two
interesting facts. First, the legal definitions of life are extremely
98 "The question of allowing an action under state wrongful death statutes to the
personal representative of a viable fetus who died in utero as a result of tortuous conduct
has left courts sharply divided. In the jurisdictions that have ruled on the question prior
to the instant case, fifteen have allowed the action and twelve have denied it." William D.
Brejcha, Torts-The Illinois Wrongful Death Act Held Inapplicable to a Viable Fetus, 3
Loy U Chi L J 402, 409 (1972).
99 Roe, 410 US it 164-65.
100 "Texas urges that, apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, life begins at
conception and is present throughout pregnancy, and that, therefore, the State has a
compelling interest in protecting that life from and after conception. We need not resolve
the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines
of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the
judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to
speculate as to the answer." Id at 159.
101 Webster v Reproductive Health Services, 492 US 490, 518-19 (1989).
102 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 505 US 833, 860
(1992).
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controversial and varied, while the legal definition of death is
much less controversial and fairly consistent. Second, the legal
definitions of life and death seem to have developed
independently of each other. Each definition has its own unique
history, and each definition developed to serve specific purposes.
This is particularly true with the definition of life; different
definitions of life are used depending upon the particular
circumstances.
The forced symmetry approach provides a new framework
for exploring the strengths and weaknesses of the differing legal
definitions of life.10 This section explains the forced symmetry
approach. In particular, it explores various potential definitions
of legal life such as conception, brain birth I, quickening,
viability, brain birth II, cardiac birth, and live birth, and their
end-of-life corollaries. This section also posits tentative
conclusions of the forced symmetry approach.
A. The Forced Symmetry Approach
Dr. John M. Goldenring made the first attempt to create
symmetry between the definitions of life and death in a letter to
the New England Journal of Medicine in 1982.104 Dr. Goldenring
argued:
[T]here is a logical, medical equivalence between an eight-
week-old fetus whose respiratory function is maintained
extracorporeally by a placenta and an eighty-year-old
with a positive electroencephalogram whose oxygenation
is facilitated by a mechanical ventilator. No physician
would doubt that the eighty-year-old was a living human
being, even if comatose. I contend that the fetus cannot be
shown to be anything but a living human being at eight
weeks if our definitions are applied consistently."15
While the letter was designed to address the medical definition
of life, and not the more controversial legal definition of life, the
103 The forced symmetry approach is particularly helpful for anyone who thinks that a
particular legal definition should be consistent across all areas of the law. While this
Article does not argue that the law should have consistent or symmetrical legal
definitions of life and death for all legal claims and purposes, it does argue that the forced
symmetry approach provides some useful insights into the current legal definitions of life
and death.
104 Goldenring, 307 New Eng J Med at 564 (cited in note 2).
105 Id.
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letter still challenges current legal thinking about the medical
definitions of life and death.
Three years later, Dr. Goldenring wrote an article in the
Journal of Medical Ethics that proposed the "brain-life theory"
for determining when a fetus becomes a human being.10 6
Goldenring's article argued that there is a logical medical
definition of life that is attained somewhere between conception
and viability.' 7 He carefully distinguished medical definitions of
what he called "humanness" from ethical decisions about
whether abortions should be allowed, and if allowed, at what
point abortion was ethically acceptable.' After distancing
himself from the abortion debate, Dr. Goldenring relied on logic
to medically define life. His insight was quite simple: logic
dictates that if the absence of something-brain functioning as
evidenced by electroencephalogram-makes a patient dead then
the emergence of that same thing-brain functioning as
evidenced by electroencephalogram-should make the patient
alive.10 9
Dr. Goldenring's article was received with both
enthusiasm"0 and suspicion."' Some bioethicists suggested an
adjustment to Goldenring's brain birth 12 analysis because it
failed to recognize that there are two types of brain death, higher
brain death and whole brain death."13 Because there are two
types of brain death, some bioethicists argued that there should
be two types of brain birth, brain birth I and brain birth II. 14
106 Goldenring, 11 J Med Ethics at 198-204 (cited in note 2).
107 Id (emphasis added).
'08 Id at 200-01.
'09 Id at 200.
110 Thomasine Kushner, Having a Life Versus Being Alive, 10 J Med Ethics 5 (1984)
(arguing that brain birth is a good criterion for life from a medical and moral perspective
because it reflects what is valuable about life).
111 Green, 66 Soundings at 152 (cited in note 5); D. Gareth Jones, The Problematic
Symmetry Between Brain Birth and Brain Death, 24 J Med Ethics 237 (1998) (arguing
that the definitions of death are not applicable to life because the processes of
development and degeneration are not interchangeable).
112 While later scholars use the term "brain birth," Dr. Goldenring's initial article
used the term "brain life." Goldenring, 11 J Med Ethics 198 (cited in note 2).
113 Jones, 24 J Med Ethics at 237-42 (cited in note 111). Higher brain death is the loss
of cortical functioning, but the brain stem remains intact and allows the lungs to breathe
and the heart to beat. Higher brain death is often associated with persons in a persistent
vegetative state. Whole brain death is the death of the whole brain, including the brain
stem. People in this state are unable to breathe for themselves and they must be kept on
a ventilator indefinitely or their cardio-pulmonary functioning will cease.
114 Id. The bioethicist recognizing this distinction ultimately argued that the
delineation between brain birth I and brain birth II had no ethical significance, even
though it is generally accepted that there is a significant ethical distinction between
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Under this proposal, brain birth I is likened to whole brain
death, which is defined as the loss of all major brain regions
including the brain stem."' Brain birth I occurs when the brain
stem begins to function, at approximately six to eight weeks
gestation. 116 Brain birth II is likened to higher brain death,
which happens when there is a lack of the cortical functioning
associated with self-consciousness. Under this definition, brain
birth II occurs at the beginning of consciousness, estimated to
begin at twenty-four to thirty-six weeks gestation.1 7
Other scholars discussing Dr. Goldenring's proposal focus
primarily on the medical definition of life and its ethical
implications for the abortion debate, organ transplantation, and
new reproductive technologies.1 ' But no one has proposed
applying a symmetrical approach11 9 to legal definitions of life and
death. 20 This paper explores the implications of the forced
symmetry approach in this context. Before doing so, it is
important to iterate some of the basic assumptions of the forced
symmetry approach.
First, for the reasons discussed in Part II, both life and
death should be defined as moments in time, and process-based
definitions should not be considered. This means that persons
whole brain death and high brain death. Id at 240-41. Jones rejects the ethical
significance of the brain birth theory because he feels that the development and
degeneration of life are not interchangeable. Id. In particular he argues that (1) in a
developmental sequence, brain birth I always precedes brain birth II, but the at the end
of life higher brain death does not always precede whole brain death, (2) there is too
much scientific ambiguity about what constitutes brain birth I and brain birth II to lend
the categories any moral significance, and (3) the potential development in fetuses differs
significantly from the memories contained in the brain at the end of life further
highlighting the asymmetrical nature of life and death. Jones, 24 J Med Ethics at 240-41
(cited in note 111).
Whether or not one agrees with these criticisms, they do not affect the validity of
this paper's assertions. At issue in this paper is not the moral significance of any
particular developmental step, but rather the value of approaching debates concerning
the legal definition of life from a symmetrical approach.
115 Id at 240.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 See, for example, Kushner, 10 J Med Ethics 5 (cited in note 110).
119 Dr. Goldenring does not call his approach the forced symmetry approach. This is a
term of art I created to summarize the approach when it is applied systematically to
various definitions of life and death.
120 Robert Veatch does have an interesting book chapter that discusses whether the
definitions of life and death should be consistent in a "moral, legal, and political" sense.
Robert M. Veatch, Definitions of Life and Death: Should There Be Consisteny, in
Margery W. Shaw & A. Edward Doudera, eds, Defining Human Life: Medical, Ethical and
Legal Considerations 99, 99-113 (1983). Veatch, however, does not explicitly mention Dr.
Goldenring's article, nor does he clearly separate out the legal implications of defining life
from the moral or political implications.
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employing the forced symmetry approach must start by selecting
a single definition of life that lies on a continuum of seemingly
reasonable choices.' 2 ' Second, the forced symmetry approach
assumes that uniformity among legal definitions of life and legal
definitions of death is preferable to a common law approach for
creating legal definitions. The approach is both logical'22 and
alleviates concerns about the inconsistency between abortion
laws and homicide laws.'23 Third, the forced symmetry approach
assumes that the legal definitions of life and death should be
connected to one another in some meaningful way. In other
words, if the loss of X-perhaps cardiac functioning-makes a
person legally dead, then perhaps the emergence of X--cardiac
functioning-should make a person legally alive. Fourth, legal
definitions of life and legal definitions of death must be mutually
exclusive. A person either has cardiac functioning or he does not.
Engaging in this exercise highlights the logic, or illogic, of
particular arguments being made in the abortion debate.
Of course, the law can create legal definitions that do not
comport with this symmetry, and in fact, there may be a
persuasive argument that life and death cannot be compared to
one another in such a simplistic way.'24 But the forced symmetry
121 The user of the forced symmetry approach could also start by choosing a single
definition of death.
122 Veatch explains this logic in the following way:
Some feature is a necessary and sufficient condition for an entity to be included in
the category of members in full standing in the human community, although it is
conceivable that the feature that brings one into the community would not be the
same as that which ushers one out. This would be the case, for instance, if there
were two or more features, each of which was sufficient for standing but no one of
which was necessary, and these features came and departed in a different time
sequence. It is hard to imagine, however, that these conditions would ever be met. It
seems that the obvious, most straightforward position is the one favoring
consistency: if there is some essential feature that gives individuals moral or legal
claims comparable to other members of the human community, loss of that feature
implies that one no longer relates to the community in the same way. We can safely
begin an examination of the definition-of-death debate with a strong presumption in
favor of consistency.
Veatch, Definitions of Life and Death at 104 (cited in note 120).
123 For example, if the law in a particular state punishes pre-viability homicide as
murder and yet recognizes the woman's right to abortion, a logical inconsistency is
created. In one instance the court is recognizing a pre-viable fetus as alive and worthy of
legal protection, yet in the abortion context it is not. This does not necessarily mean that
there cannot be good arguments made about the merits of such inconsistencies. In fact,
the forced symmetry approach forces the user to see these inconsistencies and either
develop good reasons for why they exist or admit that the legal definition is of either
limited or no value.
124 Jones, 24 J Med Ethics at 237-42 (cited in note 111). But see Veatch, Definitions of
Life and Death at 104 (cited in note 120) (arguing that there is a "strong presumption of
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approach can still be informative. It exposes the weaknesses and
strengths of a particular legal definition of life by illuminating
the end-of-life implications for the definition. Furthermore, the
forced symmetry approach encourages a holistic view of what it
means to be alive within the eyes of the law, meaning that a
consistent use of the approach may encourage the use of feticide
laws as opposed to homicide laws that define fetuses as persons,
and ultimately may increase the consistency and transparency of
the law. Additionally, the approach may help isolate the
disagreements among the pro-life and pro-choice movements,
and perhaps lead people to reconsider what life and death really
mean, or should mean, in the legal system.
B. Revelations of the Forced Symmetry Approach
This section considers seven possible definitions of legal life
and analyzes them under the forced symmetry approach. The
arguments are addressed in the same order as fetal development,
beginning with conception and ending with live birth.'25
1. Conception and the last living cell.
Many pro-life advocates suggest conception should be the
legal definition of life.'26 Under this view abortion should be
prohibited because life begins at fertilization, or when a sperm
and an egg combine into a single cell that contains a full set of
genetic material.'27 This single cell, the conceptus, is seen as a
human being.'28 Therefore, the destruction of that single cell, or
anything that it might become as it divides into multiple cells, is
murder.
There are two slight, but related, variations of the
conception theory. One view sees the conceptus, a single-cell
containing a unique set of DNA, as a person because it has a
in favor of consistency").
125 The examples given in this section are not meant to be exhaustive. Furthermore
cardiac birth is placed toward the end of this section because of its connection to cardio-
pulmonary functioning even though cardiac functioning begins twenty-one days after
conception.
126 Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood at 128 (cited in note 84).
127 Fertilization is defined as "[tihe process beginning with penetration of the
secondary oocyte by the spermatozoon and completed by fusion of the male and female
pronuclei." Stedman's Medical Dictionary 657 (Lippincott Williams & Wilkins 27th ed
2000).
128 "Essentially [the conception theory] says that a single cell is in fact a human
being." Goldenring, 11 J Med Ethics at 200-01 (cited in note 2).
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unique and determined genetic code. 129 Another, more complete
view sees the conceptus, a single-cell with a unique set of DNA,
as a person because of its potential to develop into a living,
breathing human being.
Under the first view, the forced symmetry approach dictates
that legal life ends when a person's last living cell dies. Each cell
in a person's body has a complete set of genes identical, in most
instances, 3 ' to the genes contained in the conceptus.'3 ' Since a
person's cells might survive for hours or even days after cardiac
death, this definition of death is impractical.'32 Accurate
scientific tests for determining when a person's last living cell
has died would have to be developed.'33 Organ donations would
have to be from living donors because waiting for a dead donor's
organs would render the organs useless."M Furthermore, defining
life and death as turning on the existence of a genetic code alone
would hamper basic scientific research.'35 In fact, no one has
proposed such a definition of death.'36
The second view of the conception theory becomes more
complicated under the forced symmetry approach because it
focuses on potentiality, for which there is no corollary at the end
of life. Yet new technology, such as cloning, may one day
transform a single cell into a person, theoretically erasing the
129 "It is widely held that the critical feature that gives a fetus standing is the
development of a fixed genetic code." Veatch, Definitions of Life and Death at 104-05
(cited at note 120). This view of conception may have been widely held in 1983 when
Veatch was writing, but the real possibility of cloning technology seems to have shifted
the focus of pro-life arguments to potentiality.
130 There have been examples of naturally occurring chimeras whose cells may or may
not contain the original set of DNA.
131 Goldenring, 11 J Med Ethics at 201 (cited in note 2).
132 See note 7 and accompanying text.
131 One might alleviate these practical problems by defining death as the moment
when putrefaction occurs. Putrefaction is "[diecomposition or rotting" and is
"characterized usually by the presence of toxic or malodorous products." Stedman's
Medical Dictionary at 1488 (cited in note 127). Putrefaction, though, may present its own
problems. First, there may still be living cells in the body when putrefaction occurs.
Second, while putrefaction was used as the standard of death in the seventeenth century
to ward off worries about premature burial, it would be viewed as distasteful today.
Martin S. Pernick, Back From the Grave: Recurring Controversies Over Defining and
Diagnosing Death in History, in Richard M. Zaner, ed, Death: Beyond Whole-Brain
Criteria 17, 20-21 (Kluwer 1988).
134 By the time a person's last cell died, the person's organs would be rotting.
135 For example, it is difficult to argue that the existence of a human genetic code
alone makes cells in a Petri dish legally alive human beings. To do so would require the
conclusion that we kill human beings thousands of times each day in basic laboratory
experiments.
136 See Veatch, Definitions of Life and Death at 105 (cited at note 120) ("It is obvious
that many people are pronounced dead (by any definition of death) when their genetic
patterns are sill intact.").
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power of the potentiality argument. 3 7 Scientists have theorized
that cloning techniques, primarily the ability to prompt a
person's cell, perhaps even a differentiated skin cell, 3 ' to divide
in the same way a fertilized egg divides, might someday mean
that all cells could be potential human beings. 39
Assuming that technology makes it possible to create a live
human being from a single skin cell, defining conception (or the
creation of a single cell with the potential to become a newborn)
as the beginning of life could have interesting consequences for
the definition of death. The forced symmetry approach would
demand that death be defined as the demise of a person's final
cell that has the potential to become a human.40 Defining death
in this way raises the same practical problems discussed above:
the difficulty of developing accurate scientific tests to find a
person's last living cell, the need to use live organ donors, and
the inability to do significant amounts of research. As a result,
conception does not seem like a viable definition of life without
some additional reasons for departing from the results of the
forced symmetry approach.
2. Brain birth I and whole brain death.
The beginning of electrical activity in the brain, which
signals the functioning of the brain stem, was proposed as the
appropriate medical definition of life by Dr. Goldenring."a
Approximately eight weeks after conception, the brain stem
137 Goldenring, 11 J Med Ethics at 201 (cited in note 2).
138 Differentiated cells have developed into a particular type of cell, a skin cell, for
example, and are no longer able to become other types of cells. Undifferentiated cells, like
stem cells, can become various types of cells depending upon the factors influencing their
development. "Differentiated" means "[h]aving a different character or function from the.
. . original type . . . ." Stedman's Medical Dictionary at 499 (cited in note 127).
"Undifferentiated" means "[niot differentiated; e.g., primitive, embryonic, immature, or
having no special structure or function." Id at 1907.
139 See Goldenring, 11 J Med Ethics at 201 (cited in note 2) (discussing the possibility
of cloning using a single skin cell). Cloning differentiated human cells is not currently
possible, but cloning differentiated cells has been achieved in other species. See K.H.S.
Campbell, et al, Sheep Cloned by Nuclear Transfer From a Cultured Cell Line, 380
Nature 64-66 (1996) (describing sheep cloning); Ian Wilmut, et al, Viable Offspring
Derived From Fetal and Adult Mammalian Cells, 385 Nature 810-813 (1997) (describing
sheep cloning).
'40 Without cloning capabilities, symmetry becomes more difficult to achieve. At the
beginning of life a single-celled conceptus with a unique set of DNA has potential to
become a living, breathing person, but at the end of life a person's last living cell lacks
potential. For a broader discussion of this problem, see Veatch, Definitions of Life and
Death at 110-11 (cited at note 120).
141 Goldenring, 11 J Med Ethics at 200-201 (cited in note 2).
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begins to function and electrical activity in the fetus's brain will
show up on an electroencephalogram. 14 2  This stage in
development has been called brain birth I and has been
compared to whole brain death at the end of life using the
symmetry proposed by Dr. Goldenring."
Currently, whole brain death is the standard legal definition
of death in the United States. As discussed above, this legal
definition of death, while controversial at its inception,'4 is
relatively uncontroversial today.145 Many scholars, however, have
debated the moral significance of whole brain death, particularly
in comparison to higher brain death. 14 But few articles have
discussed what a whole brain death standard would mean for the
beginning of life within a rubric like the forced symmetry
approach.
147
From the viewpoint of someone who favors symmetrical
legal definitions of life and death, using brain birth I as the legal
definition of life seems like a reasonable option. While at least
one researcher has reported finding brain activity as early as
seven weeks into pregnancy, 148 most researchers agree that the
first electroencephalogram ("EEG") activity usually occurs in the
brainstem approximately ten weeks after conception.1
49
Determining fetal electroencephalogram ("FEEG") activity seems
142 Id at 199-200.
14 Jones, 24 J Med Ethics at 237-42 (cited in note 111).
144 Capron and Kass, 121 U Pa L Rev at 87 (cited in note 19) (noting some of the
controversy and proposing that there be a statutory definition of death).
145 This does not mean that the concept of brain death is not debated in academic
circles, but rather that there is limited public debate on the topic and there have been, to
my knowledge, no serious attempts to redefine death legally. See, for example, Winston
Chiong, Brain Death without Definitions, 35 Hastings Ctr Rpt 20 (2005) (suggesting that
the brain death criteria are, and should be, controversial).
146 See, for example, Robert Veatch, The Death of Whole-Brain Death: The Plague of
the Disaggregators, Somaticists, and Mentaists, 30 J Med & Phil 353 (2005) (arguing
"for equating death with the irreversible loss of. . . integration of bodily and mental
function"); David Randall Smith, Legal Recognition of Neocortical Death, 71 Cornell L
Rev 850 (1986) (arguing that "neocortical death should be considered the death of the
person for legal purposes").
147 See, for example, Jones, 24 J Med Ethics at 237-42 (cited in note 111) (arguing that
a brain birth theory of life is problematic, partially because the concept of brain birth is
elusive). Jones' assertion that brain birth is difficult to define can be overcome if one
focuses on the very beginning of electrical activity in the brain, no matter how slight or
infrequent.
148 Winslow J. Borkowski and Richard L. Bernstine, Electroencephalography of the
Fetus, 5 Neuro 362, 363 (1955).
149 R.M. Bergstrom and Lea Bergstrom, Prenatal Development of Stretch Reflex
Functions and Brainstem Activity in the Human, 52 Annales Chirurgiae et
Gynaecologiae Fenniae Supp 1-21S (1963).
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relatively simple, and it has been done in many studies. 5 ' The
test is relatively inexpensive.151 If brain birth I were chosen as
the legal definition of life, it would not follow that tests would be
done frequently. Not every fetus would be tested for EEG
activity. Most pregnancies would proceed as they do now and
only in rare circumstances would an FEEG be necessary. The
same can be said of testing for brain death. Of the approximately
2.4 million people who die in the United States each year, fewer
than one percent are declared brain dead. 5 2 Brain birth I,
therefore, seems like it might be a relatively cost-effective
definition of life.
Adopting brain birth I as the legal definition of life, however,
may have some unwanted consequences." 3 If brain birth I
becomes the legal definition of life in all contexts, including
abortion, homicide, and wrongful death, then ending a fetus's life
after ten weeks of gestation would constitute homicide. This
would not necessarily mean that all abortions performed after
the tenth week of gestation would be prohibited. Instead, it
would mean that abortions performed after ten weeks would
have to be justified. The justification could take many forms. If
the life of the mother were at risk, then an abortion would
probably be legally justifiable on constitutional grounds or based
on an argument of self-defense, necessity, or duress. 5 4 A brain
15 See, for example, C. Weller, et al, Fetal Electroencephaography Using a New,
Flexible Electrode, 88 British J Obstetrics & Gynecology 983 (Oct. 1981). It is not clear
from the literature whether this is a routine clinical practice.
151 While it was difficult to find the costs of a FEEG, the average cost for an EEG for a
Medicare outpatient in 2004 was $344 and the average Medicare payment was $312.
American Hospital Directory, Summary of Outpatient Medicare Claims (2006), available
at <http'//www.ahd.com/sample-outpatient.html> (last visited Sept 18, 2006).
152 In 2003 and 2004 approximately 2.4 million people died in the United States.
Births, Marriages, Divorces and Deaths: Provisional Data for 2004, Nat'l Vital Statistics
Rpt, Vol 53, No 21, 1 (June 28, 2005), available at <http'//www.cdc.gov/nchs/
data/nvsr/nvsr53/ nvsr53_21.pdf> (last visited Sept 18, 2006). While the number of people
tested each year for brain death is difficult to calculate, one organ donation organization
estimates that 15,000 to 20,000 people are declared brain dead each year. The Donate
Life Coalition on Donation and the Musculoskeletal Transplant Foundation, The Gift of a
Lifetime: Understanding Death Before Donation, available at
<httpJ/www.organtransplants.org/understanding/death/> (last visited April 23, 2006).
Even if five times as many people are tested for brain death as are ultimately diagnosed
as brain dead (a number that seems high), no more than approximately four percent of
people who die each year are tested for brain death.
153 Dr. Goldenring suggests that a brain birth definition of life would have many
implications for abortion, in vitro fertilization (IVF), fetal research, the treatment of rape
victims, and the disposal of fetal remains. Goldenring, 11 J Med Ethics at 198 (cited in
note 2). Dr. Goldenring, however, generally referenced "brain life" and did not distinguish
between brain birth I and brain birth II.
15 See Bell, 33 Ariz L Rev at 907 (cited in note 97) (arguing that necessity, self-
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birth I definition of life would also severely restrict the ability of
women to obtain abortions without a legal justification. Many
women may not be able to determine that they are pregnant,
seek counseling, make a decision about the pregnancy, and
comply with any state restrictions on obtaining an abortion
within ten weeks of conception.'55
If these potential difficulties with a brain birth I definition of
life seem unacceptable, then perhaps society should look more
carefully at the current and relatively uncontroversial definition
of death, whole brain death. For if absence of electrical activity
in the brain stem means that a person is legally dead for the
purposes of organ donation, then the forced symmetry approach
dictates that brain birth I should be the legal definition of life.
3. Quickening and paralysis.
At common law, quickening was considered an important
legal and moral point in a pregnancy because it was the first sign
of life.'56 But quickening, as a legal definition of life, was not
without its problems. The quickening standard as originally used
in the law relied on the mother's determination that the baby
had moved." 7 The time of quickening varies widely from
pregnancy to pregnancy and it often takes first-time mothers
longer to feel the fetus moving.' Therefore, the quickening
standard presented potential evidentiary problems. For example,
a mother being investigated for manslaughter as a result of an
abortion would have an incentive to lie about whether she had
defense, and duress could serve as justifications for abortion under the abortion laws that
existed in the late 1980s and early 1990s).
155 While some people feel these problems already exist under current abortion law, it
is much easier to take these steps within twenty weeks of conception than it is to take
them within ten weeks. The ten-week time frame is particularly challenging given that
most pregnancy tests are unable to diagnose a pregnancy until several weeks after
conception. Laurence A. Cole, et al, Accuracy of Home Pregnancy Tests at the Time of
Missed Menses, 190 Am J Obstet & Gynecology 100 (Jan 2004) (noting that at the time of
missed menses, approximately two weeks after conception, only one of eighteen brands of
home pregnancy tests were able to accurately detect a pregnancy).
156 John Keown, Back to the Future of Abortion Law: Roe's Rejection of America's
Hstory and Traditions, 22 Issues L & Med 3, 5 (2006).
'5' See, for example, Evans v People, 49 NY 86, 90 (NY 1872) ("Although there may be
life before quickening, all the authorities agree that a child is not 'quick' until the mother
has felt the child alive within her.").
158 Manning, FetaI Medicine at 146 (cited in note 51) ("The mother's perception of the
movements of her fetus is a highly complex and variable event subject to modification by
many factors. It is usually stated that the mother will feel fetal movement (quickening)
between 16 and 20 weeks gestation, and that this event occurs somewhat earlier in the
multiparous patient and slightly later in the primigravid patient.").
[2006:
41] DEFINING LIFE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF DEA TH 73
felt the fetus move. Even if the mothers were always truthful,
there would be a bias against experienced mothers because they
would be more likely to feel fetal movement earlier in their
pregnancies.
Georgia is the only state that appears to maintain a
quickening standard in any context, and it has legally redefined
quickening so that the mother need not actually feel fetal
movement. 159 Instead courts have held that the fetus must only
be capable of limb movement to be considered quick.60 Therefore,
quickening, as an implicit legal definition of life, currently
focuses only on fetal limb movement.
This conclusion suggests that if quickening is adopted as the
legal definition of life in any jurisdiction, then perhaps paralysis
of a person's limbs 6' should be adopted as that jurisdiction's
legal definition of death.'62 But paralysis is an unacceptable
definition of death for moral reasons. There is no reason to think
that a person's ability to move is what makes a person worthy of
moral and legal status. People who are paralyzed contribute in
enormous ways to society and have traditionally been granted
the same legal rights as people with fully functioning limbs. 6 '
No one should be declared legally dead solely because they are
paralyzed.
Paralysis, if defined as death, could also create some
practical problems. For example, temporary states of paralysis
exist. They may be caused by a transient ischemic attack, a
degenerative disease such as multiple sclerosis or Lou Gehrig's
disease, or induced purposefully for medical reasons. Yet people
159 Shirley v Bacon, 267 SE2d 809, 811 (Ga App 1980) (redefining quickening in the
wrongful death context, the only context in which Georgia or any other state applies the
quickening standard).
16o Citron v Ghaffari, 542 SE2d 555, 557 (Ga App 2000) (discussing Shirley v Bacon,
267 SE2d 809).
161 To have total paralysis of a person's limbs that would prevent the type of slight
movement the court discusses in Citron v Ghaffari, 542 SE2d 555 (Ga Ct App 2000), a
person would probably have to be quadriplegic. Quadriplegia is defined as "[p]aralysis of
all four limbs." Stedman's Medical Dictionary at 1496 (cited in note 127).
162 Theoretically, quickening could be legally defined in many ways. It could be
defined in the traditional medical sense as occurring when the mother feels fetal
movement. It could be defined as the time when the fetus is capable of moving its limbs,
as the Georgia courts suggest. It could be defined as any fetal movement detectable by
any equipment, such that detection of a fetal heartbeat at eight weeks could constitute
movement. The law could even define quickening as the movement of the fetus's cells.
This section, however, focuses on the current legal definition of quickening for the
purposes of analyzing quickening under the forced symmetry approach.
163 Examples of enormously successful and influential people suffering from limb
paralysis include Stephen Hawking and Christopher Reeve.
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often recover from these temporary paralyses, and no one would
venture to declare them dead during this period. To do so could
create potentially complicated legal problems, particularly if life
insurance policies had been paid or assets from the estate
distributed during a period of temporary paralysis.
If one adopts quickening, the beginning of fetal limb
movement, as an appropriate definition of life under the forced
symmetry approach, then the absence of movement, paralysis,
should be of the definition of death. This conclusion of the forced
symmetry approach shows that defining life as fetal movement,
or quickening, is inappropriate because defining paralysis as
death is socially and morally unacceptable.
4. Viability and low probability of survival.
A fetus is viable when it is able to live independently of its
mother.16 4 The earliest legal test of viability was used in the
homicide context, and it focused on the fetus's ability to establish
independent circulation and to breathe on its own. 1 65 More recent
cases have defined viability as occurring when:
in the judgment of the attending physician ... there is a
reasonable likelihood of the fetus' sustained survival
outside of the womb, with or without artificial support.
Because this point may differ with each pregnancy,
neither the legislature nor the courts may proclaim one of
the elements entering into the ascertainment of
viability-be it weeks of gestation or fetal weight or any
other single factor. 166
164 The medical definition of viability is the "[c]apability of living; the state of being
viable; usually connotes a fetus that has reached 500 g in weight and 20 gestational
weeks." Stedman's Medical Dictionary at 1960 (cited in note 127). The medical definition
of viable is "[c]apable of living; denoting a fetus sufficiently developed to live outside of
the uterus." Id.
165 See, for example, Singleton v State, 35 S2d 375, 378 (Ala Ct App 1948) (citing a
variety of cases that use either the establishment of independent circulation, breathing,
or both as the test of viability). But see West v McCoy, 105 SE2d 88, 90-91 (SC 1958)
("[The] expression 'viable fetus' means the child has reached a stage of development
where it can live outside the female body as well as within it. A fetus generally becomes a
viable child between the sixth and seventh month of its existence.") (citations omitted).
166 Colautti v Franklin, 439 US 379, 388-89 (1979). See also Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 505 US 833, 860 (1992) (reaffirming that viability is
the point at which the state has an important and legitimate interest in protecting
prenatal life, but refusing to determine whether viability takes place prior to twenty-two
weeks, twenty-three to twenty-four weeks, twenty-eight weeks, or some other time).
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While courts generally leave medical determinations of viability
to individual physicians,167 most babies born prior to the
twentieth week of gestation are not considered legally viable.
168
Analyzing viability under the forced symmetry approach
means that the legal definition of death should be based on
probabilities of survival. If "a reasonable likelihood of the fetus'
sustained survival outside of the womb, with or without artificial
support" constitutes the legal definition of life, then the forced
symmetry approach suggests that a person's unreasonable
likelihood of sustained survival, with or without artificial
support, should be the legal definition of death. But such a
definition might mean that a person diagnosed as having less
than a five percent chance of survival should be declared dead.'69
This might be a rational way to allocate scarce resources, 170 but
most Americans would not find it to be a legally or morally
acceptable definition of death.
Legally, it would be difficult to determine both the
appropriate probability of survival and the time-frame for
sustainable survival. Even if these hurdles were overcome, there
is likely to be great variance among physician opinions on what a
particular patient's chances of survival are. A legal definition of
death based on probabilities is also likely to lead to uncertainty.
Imagine that a man enters the emergency room and doctors
determine that he has a less than five percent chance of survival
during the next forty-eight hours. In accordance with the law,
they declare him dead. What if that person defies the odds and
actually survives?17 1 If someone could be declared dead, and then
167 Id.
168 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 505 US 833, 860
(1992) (recognizing that in 1992 viability generally takes place at twenty-three to twenty-
four weeks, but ultimately leaving the viability determination up to physicians); Webster
v Reproductive Health Services, 492 US 490 (1989) (upholding a Missouri viability-
testing provision as constitutional where it created a presumption that fetuses are viable
at 20 weeks).
169 Of course what counts as an "unreasonable likelihood of survival" would be open to
debate. But see, Jacinto A. Herndndez, et al, Comment, Impact of Infants Born at the
Threshold of Viability on the Neonatal Mortality Rate in Colorado, 20 J Perinatology 276
(2000) (finding that infants at less than twenty-four weeks gestation and weighing less
than 500 grams die 94.7 percent of the time). In most hospitals infants delivered at
twenty-two weeks or less are generally only provided comfort care. Giovanna Verlato, et
al, Guideline for Resuscitation in the Delivery Room of Extremely Preterm Infants, 19 J
Child Neuro 31-34 (Jan 2004) (recommending only comfort care for infants delivered at
twenty-two weeks gestation).
170 Expensive medical resources could be allocated to those most likely to benefit from
their receipt instead of patients who have an "unreasonable likelihood of sustained
survival." The money saved could provide increased access to health care.
171 This might require us to imagine a physician that proceeds with aggressive
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declared alive, and then declared dead again, society's faith in
the appropriateness of the definitions would falter and
eventually lead to public outcries for change. 172 It is unlikely that
society would be comfortable declaring someone dead if he or she
has any chance of survival.
There is also no reason to think that insurance companies
would continue to pay for the treatment of someone who is
legally dead. But while legally dead, many people with less than
a five percent chance of survival would likely have a desire to
continue living. While doctors do refuse to treat patients in rare
circumstances,' 73 a legal rule defining death in terms of
probability of survival might result in the routine provision of
comfort care only after a person is declared legally dead.
Perhaps these concerns also make viability as a definition of
life undesirable. One way courts have dealt with some of these
concerns is to leave the determination of viability to qualified
physicians.174 But such a rule necessarily means that within a
certain range of cases, some fetuses will be declared nonviable
while other fetuses of the same weight and gestational age might
be declared viable. Furthermore, defining life or death on the
basis of probabilities for survival seems morally troubling. If
there is "something" that makes a person alive, or dead, it is
hard to think of that very special thing as a probability. The
forced symmetry approach, therefore, suggests that viability may
not be as good a measure for defining life as many think.
5. Brain birth II and neocortical brain death.
While whole brain death is the "irreversible cessation of all
functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem,"
neocortical death (higher brain death) is the "irreversible loss of
medical treatment even though he or she is not legally obligated to do so.
172 This has happened recently. See Barry Saunders, Death Can't Be Uncertain,
newsobserver.com (Jan 28, 2005), available at <http'//www.newsobserver.com/195/story/
204803.html> (last visited June 28, 2006) (discussing the story of a man who was
incorrectly pronounced dead and proclaiming that "Someone deserves punishment for
such obvious dereliction of duty. Far more important than punishment, though, is the
need for systemic changes to reduce the likelihood of this happening again."). Even if
events such as this are exceedingly rare, public outcries are to be expected. No one wants
to be the outlier that is declared dead and refused medical treatment when there is any
possibility, no matter how remote, that they are alive.
173 Verlato, Guideline for Resuscitation at 31-34 (cited in 169). (recommending only
comfort care for infants delivered at twenty-two weeks gestation).
174 See, for example, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 505
US 833, 860 (1992) (ultimately leaving the determination of viability to physicians).
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consciousness and cognitive functions."175 Neocortical death
occurs when a person's brain is irreversibly damaged so that he
or she lacks self-awareness and is unable to understand or
interact with his or her environment. 176 A person who has
undergone neocortical death can have "periods of sleep
alternating with periods of an awake-like state, in which his or
her eyes are open and may move about, and the patient may
breathe, yawn, and open his or her mouth, but not interact
meaningfully with others"; no patient in such a state for more
than a full year has ever recovered.'77 Persons who are
neocortically dead, such as Terri Schiavo, 178 may be said to be in
a persistent vegetative state.179 Given the permanent loss of a
person's personality, self-awareness, and ability to interact,
several scholars have advocated for a neocortical legal definition
of death.' These advocates often argue that neocortical death is
an appropriate legal definition of death because neocortical
functioning allows consciousness and cognition, the fundamental
qualities that make someone both human and morally
significant.''
Neocortical birth, what I call brain birth 11,182 has rarely
been proposed as a definition of life. But the few scholars that
have explored a brain birth definition of life have advocated for
its adoption for similar reasons: it is the point at which
consciousness and cognition become possible.'83 Adopting brain
birth II and neocortical death as the legal definitions of life and
175 Smith, 71 Cornell L Rev at 850-51 (cited in note 146).
176 Id at 851 n 6 (defining "neocortical death" as "a clinical condition in which the
critical elements of the central nervous system have been destroyed, leaving the patient
in an irreversible unconscious condition").
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Smith, 71 Cornell L Rev at 851 n 6 (cited in note 146).
180 See, for example, id at 852 (arguing that neocortical death should be the legal
definition of death for all purposes but that "the deceased (by prior written directive) or
the family of the deceased should have the option of maintaining biological existence,
subject to the financial ability of the estate or family to shoulder the costs of biological
maintenance").
181 See, for example, id at 860 (arguing that if neocortical functions are the "key to
human life," then their loss should be the "key to human death"); Bonnie Steinbock, Life
Before Birth 85 (Oxford 1992) (recognizing that proposals for life and death definitions
based on neocortical functioning are premised on the "idea that it is intelligence that sets
humans apart from all other creatures, and it is neocortical activity that endows human
beings with higher intellectual functions").
182 The term "brain birth II" is borrowed from Jones, 24 J Med Ethics at 237 (cited in
note 111).
18a Note, Brain Birth: A Proposal for Defining When a Fetus is Entitled to Human
Life Status, 59 S Cal L Rev 1061, 1061-62 (1986).
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death may be appropriate for practical reasons as well.
Determining neocortical birth and neocortical death, in the cases
where a scientific determination is necessary, would be relatively
inexpensive.184 Furthermore, because brain birth II occurs late in
fetal development, l"5 persons seeking an abortion would have
plenty of time to determine that they were pregnant.
On the other hand, determining brain birth II may not be so
easy or certain. Brain birth II is signaled by the emergence of
cortical activity. But the emergence of cortical activity, much like
other life processes, is a process itself. Between twenty-two and
twenty-five weeks of gestation, EEG activity, seen as bursts of
activity for up to twenty seconds followed by periods of no
activity for as long as eight minutes, can be recorded."8 6 This
means that at twenty-four weeks gestation the periods of EEG
activity only occupy approximately two percent of the EEG
recording time (if EEG activity is being continuously recorded).8 7
The periods of inactivity decrease in length and frequency until
approximately week twenty-nine to thirty-five, at which time
EEG activity occupies approximately eighty percent of the
recording time. 188 Most researchers thus place conscious activity
as occurring some time between the twenty-ninth and thirty-fifth
week.189 While the emergence of cortical activity, and hence
consciousness, is a process, there is no reason to think that there
would be a need to test every fetus. Furthermore, where there is
a need, perhaps in the context of abortions after the twenty-
ninth week, testing could be provided.
A potential problem with a neocortical brain death standard,
and hence a brain birth II definition of life, is that society is most
likely unwilling to call someone who is breathing on his or her
own dead, even if that person will never again be able to interact
meaningfully with his or her environment. And certainly it is
hard to imagine burying a breathing body or taking essential
organs from a breathing body. 9 ° To combat these concerns, the
184 See note 151 and accompanying text.
185 Brain birth II occurs somewhere between the twenty-ninth and thirty-fifth week.
Jennifer A. Burgess and S.A. Tawia, When did you first begin to feel it? Locating the
Begining ofConsciousness, 10 Bioethics 1, 20 (1996).
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Burgess and Tawia, 10 Bioethics at 20 (cited in note 185).
190 Under the current whole brain death legal standard, anencephalic infants, infants
generally considered neocortically dead but retaining brain stem function, may not be
used as organ donors. Ann Marie Rhodes, Testing the Standards of Death, 21 Am J
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law could define persons who are neocortically dead as legally
dead, allowing their estates to be opened and their assets
distributed, but create legal rules requiring the withdrawal of
water and nutrition or allowing the person to receive support as
long as the estate or family is capable of paying the bill. 9 '
Alternatively, the law could declare such persons dead, but
impose obligations on living persons to treat the dead in a
certain way. 192 For example, the law might recognize a PVS
patient as dead and obligate physicians to provide continued
medical treatment in the form of water and food. Given that no
state has yet adopted a legal definition of life or death based on
neocortical functioning, it is unlikely that the adoption of such a
standard is forthcoming, at least in the near future. Nonetheless,
legal definitions of life and death based on neocortical
functioning are among some of the best solutions under the
forced symmetry approach.
6. Cardiac birth and cardiac death.'93
For most of the twentieth century death in America was
defined almost exclusively as cardio-pulmonary death, the
cessation of both breathing and a heartbeat. Cardiac death,
while not often independently defined in the law or in medicine,
is for purposes of this paper simply the loss of a heartbeat.'
While modern physicians often do not separate pulmonary
function from cardiac function when determining death, some
early physicians believed that the heart alone held the key to
life.'95 Furthermore, it is physiologically possible to have cardiac
Maternal/Child Nursing 109, 109 (1996). But under a brain birth I/neocortical death
definition of life and death most anencephalic infants would qualify as organ donors.
191 The latter of these two legal rules is suggested in Smith, 71 Cornell L Rev at 852
(cited in note 146).
192 This happens all the time under our current legal definitions of death. See Kirsten
Rabe Smolensky, Rights of the Dead(work in progress on file with the author).
193 "Cardiac death" as used in this paper denotes only the cessation of a heartbeat and
not a myocardial infarction, where a portion of the heart's wall dies as a result of a
sudden insufficiency of blood to the heart's tissue. For a more detailed definition of
myocardial infarction see Stedman's Medical Dictionary at 894-95 (cited in note 127).
194 Generally death is defined as the "cessation of life . . . manifested by the loss of
heartbeat, by the absence of spontaneous breathing, and by cerebral [death]." Id at 460.
Such a definition encompasses cardiopulmonary death and brain death. Likewise
cardiopulmonary death encompasses what I call cardiac death and pulmonary death
because the cessation of breath and the cessation of the heartbeat can happen
independently of one another. Therefore, the legal definition of death could be cardiac
death independent of pulmonary death or vice versa.
195 "Classical Greek physicians believed that death could begin in the lungs, brain or
heart, but that the heart alone served as the seat of life; the first organ to live and the
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
functioning without pulmonary functioning and vice versa. While
the cessation of a heartbeat and cessation of breathing often
occur within moments of each other, it is not impossible to
contemplate a legal definition of death that focuses on cardiac
functioning without pulmonary functioning.'96
The specifics of defining cardiac death, however, greatly
impact its usefulness as a legal definition. For example, a
person's heart might stop beating, but it might not make sense to
consider that person legally dead if his heart is restarted
momentarily via an electrical shock. Additionally, a person
undergoing heart surgery might be placed on a heart-lung
bypass machine during which time his heart would not beat, yet
the patient would not be considered dead. If the surgery is
successful, the heart is successfully restarted. 9 ' In both surgery
and non-surgery situations where a heart stops beating, there is
a possibility that the patient will regain a heartbeat. During
these minutes, or hours, however, future heartbeats are not
certain.
Legal determinations of death should not be declared during
moments of uncertainty; legal determinations of death must be
final. Furthermore, the legal significance of death and various
administrative considerations make it impractical to declare
someone dead one minute and alive the next, only to declare
them dead again several minutes, days, or years later. But a
determination of cardiac death does not have to be impractical.
Perhaps only a more accurate legal definition of cardiac death is
required. For example, cardiac death could be defined as "the
permanent cessation of a heartbeat as determined by accepted
medical standards." Such a definition leaves the determination of
death to medical professionals, allowing them to decide whether
a person is dead after ten or twenty minutes of attempted
resuscitation or whether the person is dead immediately after
last to die. The heart created the vital spirits, the essence of life. Thus, the heartbeat
alone distinguished between the living and the dead. Breathing merely regulated the
heat of the heart." Pernick, Back From the Grave at 18 (cited in note 16).
196 In the clinical setting, cardiac death and pulmonary death may happen so close to
one another in time that there is little practical difference. But separating the two
definitions when using the forced symmetry approach is important because cardiac birth
and pulmonary birth happen at different times at the beginning of life.
197 One-year survival rates from heart transplantation surgery are currently eighty-
eight percent. This means that not only was the heart successfully started after surgery,
but the patient also survived at least one year. Frances M. Hoffman, Outcomes and
Complications After Heart Transplantation: A Review, 20 J Cardiovascular Nursing S31,
S31 (Sept/Oct Supp 2005).
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the heart stops beating (as may be the case if the patient has a
DNR order).
The converse of cardiac death, cardiac birth, would therefore
occur when a fetus's heart started to beat. A fetus's heart begins
to beat twenty-two days after conception, signaling the beginning
cardiac life.'98 Arguably cardiac life does not truly exist when
cardiac functioning and circulation are being maintained by the
fetus's mother, but something similar is true of an adult
sustained by a heart-lung bypass machine.
Using cardiac life and death as the legal definitions of life
and death may be a particularly good option for those who
believe that the heart is the key to life. It is also attractive for
those wishing to make determinations of death cost effective,'99
but it most likely serves as a poor legal definition of life for
several practical reasons. It would be virtually impossible for a
pregnant woman to know that she was pregnant and then
successfully seek an abortion within twenty-two days of
conception. 00  While some pregnancy tests can detect a
pregnancy as soon as six days after ovulation, most pregnancy
tests cannot detect a pregnancy until at least two weeks after
ovulation, or the first day of a missed period.2 ' Since it can take
up to three days after ovulation to conceive, this means that
some women may not know they are pregnant until at least
eleven days after conception. Some studies have suggested that
most home pregnancy tests are not accurate until several days or
perhaps even weeks after a missed period.0 2 Therefore, a woman
may not be able to determine if she is pregnant until twenty-two
or twenty-three days after conception even if she is intently
looking for a pregnancy.
From a theoretical viewpoint, there is no particular reason
to think that cardiac functioning necessarily defines life. While
cardiac functioning may be an important factor in determining
198 William J. Larsen, Human Embryology 166 (Churchill 3rd ed 2001).
199 The relatively low-tech nature of determining cardiac death, via the use of a
stereoscope by a trained and legally authorized medical practitioner, makes it
exceptionally cost effective.
200 A fetus's heart begins to beat on the twenty-second day after conception. Larsen,
Human Embryology at 166 (cited in note 198).
201 The National Women's Health Information Center, US Dept of Health & Human
Services, Frequently Asked Questions about Pregnancy Tests, available at
<http'//www.4woman.gov/faq/pregtest.htm> (last visited Feb 23, 2005).
202 Laurence A. Cole, et al, Accuracy of Home Pregnancy Tests at the Time of Missed
Menses, 190 Am J Obstetrics & Gynecology 100 (Jan 2004) (finding that only sixteen
percent of home pregnancy tests were able to detect a pregnancy on the first day of a
missed period).
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life or death, it seems difficult to argue that it is solely the
absence or emergence of a heartbeat that makes us alive.
7. Live birth and the cessation of breathing.
The born alive rule has been used for several different
causes of action throughout America's legal history. 3 For
example, early tort law held that no claim could be made for
prenatal injury to a fetus unless that fetus was subsequently
born alive.20 4 Under early criminal law, a person could not be
convicted for killing a child in utero unless the child was born
alive.0 5 Generally, a live birth was proved if the child attained
circulation and respiration independent from its mother.0 6
If independence from one's mother as evidenced by
breathing establishes legal life,20 v then under the forced
symmetry approach the cessation of independent breathing
should be the legal definition of death. Under both definitions
the independent ability to breathe means the ability of an
individual to breathe absent any biological 0. or mechanical
203 See notes 54, 72 and accompanying text.
204 Approximately ten states still follow the born alive rule for wrongful death claims.
See Bolin v Wingert, 764 NE2d 201, 205 (Ind 2002).
205 See generally, Shah, 29 Hofstra L Rev at 936-38 (cited in note 50). See also
Canfield v State, 56 Ind 168, 170 (Ind 1877) (citing John Wilder May, 3 Greenleaf on
Evidence §136 (Little, Brown 13th ed 1876)) ("To support an indictment for infanticide, at
common law, it must be clearly proved that the child was wholly born, and was born
alive, having an independent circulation, and existence.").
206 State v Winthrop, 43 Iowa 519 (1876). See, for example, State v Sogge, 161 NW
1022, 1023 (ND 1917) (affirming defendants' conviction for manslaughter where there
was medical testimony that the child's "lungs were filled with air; that they possessed the
color of the lungs of a child rather than a foetus; that the pulmonary arteries were
enlarged; [and] that foetal circulation had ceased and natural circulation commenced");
Groff v Anderson, 15 SW 866, 866 (Ky App 1891) (holding that a child was born alive
where it made an effort to breathe even if was not able to achieve a full inspiration). See
also Stanley B. Atkinson, Life, Birth, and Live-Birth, 20 L Q Rev 134, 142-47 (1904)
(noting that live birth was legally defined as the occurrence of a vital act as determined
by a medical man and did not necessarily require that the child had breathed, but
ultimately conceding that in the medical world "breathing is taken as the rough test of
live-birth" and that a legal finding of live birth is "usually .. . supported by signs of
inspiration"). But see Paul H. Winfield, The Unborn Child, 8 Cambridge L J 76, 78-79
(1942-44) (arguing that a child was not born alive until it established circulation
independent of its mother's and that whether the child had breathed was irrelevant).
207 Other evidence of independence or vitality, such as the complete expulsion of the
fetus from the mother's body, movement, and the establishment of independent
circulation, were also relied upon, but where there were no witnesses to the birth other
than the mother, the court often had to rely on circumstantial evidence and the finding of
a live birth was "usually ... supported by signs of inspiration." Atkinson, 20 L Q Rev at
146-47 (cited in note 206).
208 Fetal breathing activity can be recorded by measuring fetal nasal fluid flow
velocity. Samvel S. Badalian, et al, Fetal Breathing Characteristics and Postnatal
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support. While the inability to breathe independently was
historically a sign of imminent death, twentieth-century
advances in technology, such as the iron lung and its
predecessors, have allowed people to breathe when they
otherwise might have died. The ability to breathe independently,
therefore, is not as vital as it once was to modern definitions of
life and death.
A definition of death focused on the unsupported breathing
of air also creates some of the same practical problems created by
a cardiac death definition of death. For example, if someone
requires temporary mechanical assistance with breathing, it
would be legally problematic to declare that person dead only to
declare him or her alive again after removal of a ventilator. But
even if the legal definition of death were changed to focus on the
permanent inability to breathe independently, it would be
morally unacceptable. Many people live daily with the assistance
of breathing devices such as mechanical ventilators,. 9 and most
people would find it morally reprehensible to declare these
people legally dead.21° While it is true that inability to breathe
will eventually lead to the cessation of cardio-pulmonary
functioning and brain activity, and hence death under a myriad
of possible legal definitions, it does not seem readily apparent
that a legal definition of life in today's technological world need
turn on one's ability to breathe independently. It seems,
therefore, that a legal definition of life or death that relies on
one's ability to breathe without biological or mechanical support
is outdated and impractical. The born alive rule, therefore, may
need to be revisited as an implicit legal definition of life.
Outcomes in Cases of Congenital Diaphragmatic Hernia, 171 Am J Obstetrics and
Gynecology 970 (1994). Such activity is supported biologically by the mother and is
distinct from the inspiration of air.
29 People with neuromuscular or musculoskeletal diseases, such as Lou Gehrig's
disease, muscular dystrophy, spinal muscular atrophy, and scoliosis, and people who
have sustained a high spinal cord injury, are often ventilator dependent because they are
unable to breath continuously on their own. Some individuals may be able to breathe on
their own during the day and need mechanical ventilation at night, while other patients
require twenty-four-hour support. For more detailed information about ventilator
dependence, see National Ventilator Users Network, Information About Ventilator
Assisted Living (revised ed 2005), available at <httpJ/www.post-polio.org/ivun/
aboutvall.html> (last visited Sept 18, 2006).
210 People who are ventilator-dependent can live full, rewarding lives. Christopher
Reeve was probably the best-known ventilator-dependent person in the United States.
During the nine years that he was ventilator-dependent, he made numerous public
appearances and became very politically involved. Many of his public appearances and
political activities are recorded at www.chrisreevehomepage.com.
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CONCLUSION
Using the forced symmetry approach to explore possible
legal definitions of life and death provides useful and interesting
insights into both the abortion debate and the academic debates
about when legal life should begin or end. While this Article does
not advocate a particular definition of life or death, for it is only
meant to provide an introduction to the forced symmetry
approach,2 ' some basic conclusions can be reached.
The forced symmetry approach suggests that conception,
quickening, and viability may not be good legal definitions of life.
Conception may not be a good definition of legal life because its
end-of-life corollary is the death of a person's last living cell, and
it is difficult to think of a legal person solely as a single cell with
a fixed genetic code that has the potential to develop into a
human being. This conclusion gathers more support, of course, if
cloning technology becomes available because cloning technology
is likely to diminish the strength of the potentiality argument.212
Quickening has been an accepted legal definition of life in some
areas of the law for a long time, but using paralysis, its end-of-
life corollary, as the legal definition of death is morally
unacceptable. Drawing this parallel, therefore, eliminates
quickening as a reasonable option for the definition of legal life.
Defining life as viability under the forced symmetry approach
necessitates defining death in terms of probabilities of survival.
Under a probability-of-su rvival definition of death, one might
imagine that a person becomes legally dead when, for example,
he has less than a five percent chance of survival over the
following six-month period."' As no one wants to be declared
211 The hope is that other scholars will engage in a discussion about the usefulness of
the forced symmetry approach and its potential conclusions.
212 In response to this conclusion, one could make an argument that technological
tinkering with life (or potential life) should change the rules of the forced symmetry
approach. Persons making this argument would also have to address how technology
affects the definitions of cardiac life and death, brain birth, brain death, and many other
possible definitions of life and death.
213 1 chose a six-month time frame because the standard for referring patients to
hospice is one hundred percent expected mortality within six months. See, for example,
Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicare Benefit Policy Manual, Ch. 9:
Coverage of Hospice Care Under Hospital Insurance, §10 (Rev 28 Dec 3, 2004) (stating
that Medicare will cover the cost of hospice services if the patient is covered under Part A
of Medicare and terminally ill, where an "individual is considered terminally ill if the
medical prognosis is that the individual's life expectancy is six months or less if the
illness runs its normal course"). Of course other time periods or percentages could be
chosen under a probability of survival rubric. This is only meant to serve as an example.
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dead simply because his or her chances of survival are low, such
a definition of death is extremely unlikely to be socially
acceptable. This calls into doubt the use of viability, also a
definition based on the chances of survival, as an appropriate
definition of legal life.
The forced symmetry approach also suggests that brain-
based definitions of life or death, while not completely
unproblematic, may be preferable to other options. A brain birth
I definition of life, with recognition of life at ten weeks gestation,
suggests that perhaps a whole brain death legal definition of
death should be more controversial than it currently is. But
given the relatively uncontroversial nature of a whole brain
death definition of legal death, it is not unreasonable to think
that brain birth I may serve as a good definition of life. Another
approach, particularly for persons concerned with a woman's
right to have an abortion, might be to adopt brain birth II and
neocortical death as legal definitions of life and death.
While all possible definitions of life and death seem to have
some faults, the forced symmetry approach does highlight some
interesting problems with historical and current legal definitions
of life and death. Hopefully, practicing attorneys, scholars,
physicians, politicians, and activists will use this approach along
with others when debating what the appropriate legal definitions
of life and death should be.

